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I
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, sixteen-year-old Brenda Spencer shocked the nation
when she opened fire at Grover Cleveland Elementary, killing the principal and
custodian, and wounding eight children.1  In today’s world, such horrifying
school shootings have become almost commonplace.  In 1997, two separate
shooting rampages took the lives of seven students.  The first occurred on Oc-
tober 1 in Pearl, Mississippi, when sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham killed his
mother before killing three students and wounding seven others at his high
school.2  The second school shooting that year occurred on December 1 in West
Paducah, Kentucky, when fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal killed three stu-
dents at a morning high school prayer meeting.3  In 1998, almost three times as
many students lost their lives in school shootings.  On March 24 in Jonesboro,
Arkansas, thirteen-year-old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew
Golden killed four schoolmates and a teacher after setting the fire alarm to
draw their victims out into their line of fire.4  On May 21 in Springfield, Oregon,
fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel killed his parents and later opened fire in the school
cafeteria, shooting twenty-four classmates, two fatally.5  The largest, most
frightening school massacre occurred on April 20, 1999, in Littleton, Colorado,
when Eric Harris, eighteen, and Dylan Klebold, seventeen, opened fire at Col-
umbine High School, killing thirteen people before taking their own lives.6
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1. See Tamara Jones, Echoes of a Different Schoolyard, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1999, at C1.
2. See JAMES GARBARINO, LOST BOYS 2-3 (1999).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 3, 132.
5. See id. at 3.
6. See Jonathan Rauch, Hey, Kids! Don’t Read This!, 31 NAT’L J. 2003 (1999); Charlie Brennan,
Death, Murder Once Ran Through Cassie’s Mind, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 10, 1999,
at 4A.
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
134 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
As these high profile events escalate, so do the thousands of less visible
homicides that occur daily in inner cities and in poor, minority neighborhoods.
Approximately twenty-three thousand homicides occur each year in the United
States, roughly ten percent of which involve a perpetrator who is under eight-
een years of age. 7  Between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, the number of
youths committing homicides had increased by 168%.8  Juveniles currently ac-
count for one in six murder arrests (17%),9 and the age of those juveniles gets
younger and younger every year.  For example, in North Carolina in 1997, sev-
enty juveniles under eighteen years of age were arrested on murder charges.
Thirty-five were seventeen, twenty-four were sixteen, seven were fifteen, and
four were thirteen or fourteen.10  In 1999, for the first time in North Carolina’s
history, two eleven-year-old twins were charged with the premeditated murder
of their father as well as the attempted murder of their mother and sister.11
As a result of both the increase in the juvenile homicide rates and the in-
crease in highly publicized school shootings, Americans are demanding harsher
punishments for the juveniles that commit them.  For example, “[i]n the days
after the Jonesboro, Arkansas, shootings in March 1998, an opinion poll re-
vealed that about half the adults in America believed that the two boys who
shot their classmates should receive the death penalty.”12  Those boys were thir-
teen and eleven years of age.  Facing strong, punishment-oriented constituen-
cies, legislators and prosecutors are seeking to impose the death penalty on
younger and younger offenders, both through the legislation they propose and
the punishments they seek in trial.  When seeking the death penalty for juve-
niles under the age of sixteen, these legislators and prosecutors do not seem to
be concerned with the United States Supreme Court constitutional requirement
that offenders be at least sixteen before they can be sentenced to death.13
The issue of whether the imposition of the death penalty is constitutional
under the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the United States Con-
stitution has long been debated.  On February 3, 1997, the American Bar Asso-
ciation (“ABA”) called for a moratorium on the death penalty until serious
flaws in its administration could be corrected.14  Among the most serious prob-
lems cited was the Supreme Court’s refusal to prohibit the execution of juvenile
Bernall Family’s Book Chronicles Years Before Her Death at Columbine, LONDON FREE PRESS, Sept.
27, 1999.
7. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 6.
8. See id. at 7.
9. See Victor Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class Citizens in
Capital Punishment, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 206 (James R. Acker et
al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Streib, Executing Women].
10. See Anne Saker, Twins’ Shooting Puzzles Experts 11 Year-Olds’ Acts Defy Explanation, NEWS
& OBSERVER, Apr. 11, 1999, at A1.
11. See id.
12. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 20.
13. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
14. See American Bar Association, Resolution of the House of Delegates (Feb. 1997); American
Bar Association, Report No. 107 (1997), reprinted in Appendix, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219
(Autumn 1998).
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offenders under the age of eighteen.15  In a recent symposium of Law and Con-
temporary Problems entitled “The ABA’s Proposed Moratorium on the Death
Penalty,”16 Victor L. Streib, Carol Steiker, and Jordan Steiker supported the
ABA’s position that the juvenile death penalty should be eliminated.
This note attempts to carry their arguments forward by looking more deeply
at why juveniles commit homicides, and by suggesting more effective ways for
society to address the problem presented by child killers.  Part II describes the
history of the death penalty in the United States, both as it has been applied in
practice and how it has been viewed by the Supreme Court.  Part III discusses
the history of the juvenile death penalty, the circumstances under which it has
been imposed in the United States, how it has been treated by the Supreme
Court, and how it is viewed by the international community.  Part IV looks at
the many different factors that may induce a child to kill.  This section demon-
strates that “juveniles on death row have a disproportionate number of social
and psychological problems, including unstable and abusive family back-
grounds, drug and alcohol addiction at a very young age, mental illness and
brain damage.”17  Part V discusses the problems with the current system, which
allows sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders to be sentenced to death, and
demonstrates how this practice runs counter to the basic assumptions about ju-
veniles that underlay other areas of both civil and criminal law.  Particularly
important is the system’s failure to recognize the fundamental differences that
distinguish juveniles under the age of eighteen from adults, differences that re-
duce the criminal culpability of juvenile offenders.  Finally, Part VI suggests
other possible solutions for dealing with the increase in juvenile homicides in
today’s society.
II
HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The United States has considered the death penalty an acceptable form of
punishment for over four centuries.  Nearly eighteen thousand lawful execu-
tions have occurred in U.S. territories, the earliest occurring in 1608 in colonial
Virginia.18  At that time, the death penalty was not limited to punishment for
murder.  In many jurisdictions, the death penalty could be imposed for crimes
such as rape, kidnapping, armed robbery and even some assaults.19  “At the time
of the American Revolution, all of the colonies except Rhode Island had 10 or
15. See James E. Coleman, Jr., Foreword,  61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (Autumn 1998).
16. Symposium, The ABA’s Proposed Moratorium on the Death Penalty, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1998).
17. Barbara Frey, International Standards and the Execution of Juvenile Defendants, in
MACHINERY OF DEATH 80 (Enid Harlow et al. eds., 1995).
18. See James R. Acker et al., American’s Experiment with Capital Punishment in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
19. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
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more capital crimes on their books.”20  Although capital punishment has always
held a prominent place in the criminal law history of the United States, the
United States Supreme Court did not address its constitutionality until the
1970s, denying certiorari to the increasing number of challenges that arose
during the 1950s and 1960s and allowing the states to impose capital punish-
ment however they saw fit.21
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,22 the Supreme Court found that
the extraordinary amount of discretion given to juries in the sentencing phase of
capital trials violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment estab-
lished by the Eighth Amendment.23  The decision effectively stalled capital
punishment in the states, as legislators struggled to create statutes that met
Furman’s constitutional requirements.  Beginning what has been considered a
new era of death penalty jurisprudence, the decision mandated that capital
punishment must measurably further two goals in order to survive a constitu-
tional challenge: the goals of retribution and deterrence.24  Whether these goals
are served has become a critical factor in determining whether the death pen-
alty, as applied to a particular section of society, survives constitutional scrutiny.
Despite an increase in the constitutional litigation of capital punishment
during the 1950s and 1960s, the Court did not agree to review the constitution-
ality of the death penalty until its 1972 Furman decision.  Furman followed one
year after a due process challenge to the unguided discretion in capital sen-
tencing failed in McGautha v. California.25  McGautha argued that the unbridled
discretion of juries in sentencing capital cases violated his right not to be de-
prived of life without due process of law.  In response, Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority, indicated his belief that creating standards to effectively guide
jury sentencing discretion would be not only impossible, but unnecessary.26  He
believed the jury could be trusted to make the decision between life and death.27
Bringing their claim at a time when popular support for the death penalty
was waning, the petitioners in Furman advanced a completely different theory.
They argued that imposing the death penalty was no longer consistent with
American values, and therefore constituted cruel and unusual punishment,
which is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.28  The Court did not find that
20. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Beyond Human Ability?  The Rise and Fall of Death Pen-
alty Legislation, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 82 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 1998).
21. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 48-49.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
23. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
24. See id. at 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
25. 402 U.S. 183 (1971); see also Acker & Lanier, supra note 20, at 80.
26. See McGautha v. California, 403 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
27. See id.
28. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 285 (“The question, then, is whether the deliberate infliction of death
is today consistent with the command of the Clause that the state may not inflict punishments that do
not comport with human dignity.”) (emphasis added); see id. at 291 (“In comparison to all other pun-
ishments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to
human dignity.”) (emphasis added); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) (“Furman and
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
Page 133: Summer 2000] KIDS WHO KILL 137
the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment per se, but made clear that
the current state practices implementing the death penalty were unconstitu-
tional due to the unguided sentencing discretion given to juries.29  The infre-
quency of death sentences and executions demonstrated a great disparity be-
tween the death penalty’s availability and its use.  No evidence suggested that a
sentence of death was saved for the “worst” offenses in the death-eligible class.30
This, coupled with the jury’s unbridled discretion, made the decision between
life and death unacceptably arbitrary.  A punishment handed down so arbitrar-
ily and infrequently did not serve either the retributive or the deterrent func-
tions of the death penalty.31
Although the immediate effect of the Furman decision was to invalidate the
death penalty statutes in thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal government, the decision left unclear the standards that had to be met
to make the death penalty constitutional.  Because each of the five majority jus-
tices and each of the four dissenters appended a detailed conclusion to the per
curiam opinion, legislatures had difficulty making an exact determination of the
criteria capital statutes had to meet.  Then, in 1976, the Court clarified its Fur-
man holding when it upheld three newly amended death penalty statutes and
struck down two others.32  In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court seemed to set out a
three-prong test for judging when a punishment of death was appropriate.
First, the punishment must not have been forbidden at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted.33  Second, the punishment must not violate “the evolving
standards of decency that marked the progress of a maturing society.”34  And,
third, the punishment must not be “so excessive or disproportionate as to be in-
consistent with the basic concepts of human dignity.”35  While this test may ap-
pear helpful at first glance, neither Gregg nor its companion decisions clarified
how to determine society’s evolving standards of decency, as each statute was
upheld or struck down for its own mix of procedural protections or lack
thereof.36  The Court did make clear, however, that a mandatory death sentence
was not constitutionally acceptable.37  The death penalty could not be imposed
without individual consideration of the particular circumstances surrounding
its companion cases predicated their argument primarily upon the asserted proposition that standards
of decency had evolved to the point where capital punishment could no longer be tolerated.”).
29. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 369-71 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
30. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
32. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 50.  In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld death penalty
statutes challenged in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), and
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  It struck down the death penalty statutes challenged in Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
33. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (1976).
34. Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 713, 758 (1996) (quoting Trop v. Dul-
les, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
35. Id. (citation omitted).
36. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 50.
37. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 57.
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the offense and the offender, including both the aggravating factors warranting
death and the mitigating factors supporting a lesser sentence. By its very nature,
a mandatory death sentence could not allow for any individualized considera-
tion.
Several overlapping and sometimes inconsistent themes emerge from the
Court’s post-Furman decisions upholding various state death penalty statutes.38
First, state death penalty statutes must narrow the class of offenders eligible for
the death penalty so that punishment is imposed only upon the “worst” offend-
ers.39  Second, death penalty statutes must provide clear guidelines that establish
when offenders are death-eligible so that the sentencer remains focused on the
relevant information during the sentencing phase.40  Third, capital defendants
must be given the right to present, and to have the sentencer consider, all miti-
gating factors that might warrant a sentence less than death.  This factor, the
need for individualized determinations, is in constant tension with the need to
make sure that death penalty statutes carry sufficient guidelines to ensure that
sentences are not imposed arbitrarily.41  Finally, death sentences must meet a
standard of “heightened reliability”—another precaution against arbitrariness.42
To meet this standard, state supreme courts immediately review death sen-
tences to ensure that the punishment imposed does not exceed that which other
offenders have received for similar offenses.
III
THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. History of Executing Juveniles in the United States
The first recorded state execution of a condemned juvenile was in 1642,
when Thomas Graunger was put to death in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts.43
Before that time, colonial America’s favored punishment for juvenile offenders
was to have parents “beat the devil” out of their child if he or she committed a
crime.44  Parents could be required to publicly execute, whip, or even banish
their children if society found them to be criminally liable.45
38. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 51-52, 57.
39. See id. at 52-53.
40. See id. at 54-55.
41. See id. at 55-56.
42. See id.
43. See Victor L. Streib, Ohio Northern University, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sen-
tences and Executions For Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973—June 30, 1999 (visited June 15, 2000)
<http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm> [hereinafter Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty To-
day].
44. See Mary E. Spring, Comment, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to
the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1354-55 (1998).
45. See id.
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In the three and a half centuries since the first execution of a juvenile of-
fender, 361 Americans have been executed for crimes committed as juveniles.46
Thirty-eight states and the federal government have carried out these execu-
tions, which comprise only 1.8% of the total confirmed American executions
since 1608.47  Seventeen of these executions have taken place since 1973, during
the current era of post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence, and nine have oc-
curred in Texas. 48  Although stays on death row used to last only a few years,
current juvenile offenders can spend between six and twenty years on death
row.49
The seventeen executions that have occurred in the post-Furman era repre-
sent only a fraction of the 172 juvenile death sentences that have been imposed
during that time.50  Juvenile death sentences account for only 2.7% of the total
number of death sentences imposed in the United States since 1973.51  Twenty-
two states are responsible for imposing these juvenile death sentences, over
two-thirds of which have been imposed on seventeen-year-old offenders. 52  The
rest have been imposed on fifteen- and sixteen-year-old offenders.  No death
sentences have been imposed on offenders who were fourteen or younger at the
time of their crime.53  Only sixty-seven of the 172 (39%) death sentences im-
posed during the current era are currently in force.  Thirteen (7%) of those
have resulted in executions, and ninety-two (53%) have been reversed.54  Ex-
cluding the cases still pending appeal, the reversal rate for death sentences im-
posed on juvenile offenders is 89%.55
While the imposition of death sentences on juvenile offenders has remained
fairly constant in the post-Furman era, the number of actual executions has in-
creased sharply during the 1990s.56  Ten of the thirteen post-Furman executions
of juvenile offenders have occurred during this decade.  One juvenile offender
was executed in 1990, another in 1992, four in the last six months of 1993, three
in 1998, and one in 1999.57  The last juvenile offender to be executed was Sean
Sellers, who was age sixteen at the time of his offense.58
46. See Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today, supra note 43, at 8.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Victor Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty For Juveniles, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 67 (Autumn 1998) [hereinafter Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty].
52. See id. at 69.
53. See id. at 67.
54. See Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today, supra note 43.
55. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 69.
56. See Streib, Executing Women, supra note 9, at 206.
57. See Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today, supra note 43.
58. See id.
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Sean Sellers was the first offender under the age of seventeen to be exe-
cuted since 1959.59  Sellers was sentenced to death for killing a convenience
store clerk and then shooting and killing his mother and stepfather a few
months later.60  This “exceptionally bright student” got involved in a self-styled
satanic cult, which developed out of his interests in Satanism and the fantasy
game of Dungeons and Dragons.61  Soon Sellers had “dropped off the high
school honor roll, lost interest in sports . . . and was conducting satanic worship
services in an abandoned farmhouse with eight or so other youths who joined
his self-styled cult.”62  In the course of one sacrificial ritual, the boys stole a .357
magnum and shot a convenience store clerk who had once refused to sell them
beer.63  A few months later, Sellers killed his parents as part of a satanic ritual
when they refused to let him see his girlfriend and dragged him back home fol-
lowing an attempt to run away.64  At trial, the jury rejected his insanity defense
and sentenced him to die.65
B. How the Law Views Juveniles
Criminal law has always held juveniles to a different standard of account-
ability from adults.  In the 1600s, the law established the age of seven as the
point after which a child could be held criminally responsible for his or her ac-
tions.66  Because children under the age of seven did not understand the conse-
quences of their actions and therefore could not be held responsible for them,
they were deemed, as a matter of law, unable to form the intent required to be
culpable for a criminal act.67  Children over the age of seven who were found
criminally culpable would face adult punishments because they had the requi-
site maturity to understand the consequences of their actions.68  While capital
punishment for juvenile offenders was not specifically addressed in the seven-
teenth century, the death penalty was not reserved for those we consider
“adults” in the twentieth century.  Although there are no recorded executions
of juveniles during that period, Connecticut law, which embraced the Biblical
Law as set forth in the Book of Exodus, imposed capital punishment on chil-
dren sixteen or older, if they merely cursed or hit their parents.69
The view that punishing children below a certain age was inherently differ-
ent from punishing adults persisted through the eighteenth century.  According
to Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 1768, “infants under the age of dis-
59. See Streib, Executing Women, supra note 9, at 207 (noting that Leonard M. Shockley, age 16 at
the time of his crime, was executed on April 10, 1959 in Maryland).
60. See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, WHEN CHILDREN KILL 71-72 (1990).
61. Id. at 72.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 717.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Spring, supra note 44, at 1351 n.33.
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cretion ought not to be punished by any criminal prosecution whatever . . . the
age of discretion is.”70  When children were too young to understand their
criminal conduct, it was the parent’s responsibility, not the state’s, to determine
the appropriate punishment.  Because children knew that they were required to
obey their parents before they knew or understood the laws of the state, the
state would not interfere with the parent’s punishment.71
The Industrial Revolution created a major shift in the way the United States
viewed and treated its juvenile offenders.72  As children left their homes and
farms to enter the nation’s work force, the responsibility for punishment shifted
from the parent to the state.73  States created “houses of refuge” where delin-
quent children were detained, and although this policy was ultimately unsuc-
cessful in curbing the growing tide of juvenile delinquency, it paved the way for
the state-administered reform schools of the mid-nineteenth century.74  Unfor-
tunately, these reform schools also failed to live up to expectations because the
poor post-Civil War economy forced them to operate more as warehouses,
where children were exploited for their labor, than as rehabilitative facilities,
where children were prepared to re-enter society.  Looking for a more effective
solution, reformers eventually created the juvenile court system.75
Based on the idea that caring for juvenile offenders in a healthy home envi-
ronment would best serve the child’s welfare, Illinois opened the first juvenile
court for offenders under the age of sixteen in 1899.76  The juvenile court system
was intended “to protect the state’s right to use parens patriae for official inter-
vention in the juvenile’s life, especially if the youth was neglected.”77  By 1912,
all the states except two had established juvenile court systems.78  Although the
primary goal of the juvenile court was rehabilitating the child, as juvenile crime
continued to increase in the twentieth century, the emphasis slowly shifted to-
ward controlling the juvenile offenders rather than meeting their special needs.79
The sharpest shift in society’s attitude toward juvenile offenders occurred in
the 1970s, when children began committing violent crimes with much greater
frequency.80  Once society decided that stronger punishment was the answer, re-
habilitation never again became a primary concern.  The 1987 federal sentenc-
ing guidelines reflected the continued perception that the juvenile justice sys-
tem needed to be replaced by a more punitive system.81  Escalating juvenile
70. Johnson, supra note 34, at 749.
71. See id. at 717.
72. See Spring, supra note 44, at 1355.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1356.
76. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 718; Spring, supra note 44, at 1356.
77. Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 137 (1995).
78. See id.
79. See Spring, supra note 44, at 1356-57.
80. See id. at 1358.
81. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 721-22.
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crime rates convinced legislatures that state juvenile courts were not able to suf-
ficiently punish or deter juvenile offenders.  As part of America’s new “get
tough” attitude toward juvenile crime, certain offenses required automatic
transfer to adult criminal court.82  In other cases, either the prosecutors or the
court itself would make the decision regarding whether an offender should be
transferred.83  These new provisions for transfer implicitly indicated that juve-
nile offenders would be subject to the same punishments that the courts could
give adults guilty of the same offense.84  Under the transfer system, non-
mandatory judicial waiver requires a hearing to determine whether the juvenile
is amenable to treatment or is a threat to public safety.  This determination is
based, among other things, on the seriousness of the offense, the manner in
which it was committed, the maturity of the juvenile, his or her prior criminal
record, and the prospect of rehabilitation.85  Although each of those factors can
theoretically be outweighed by another, serious felonies—such as homicide—
almost always result in transfer to adult criminal court.86
C. How Juveniles Are Treated Outside Criminal Law
Legislatures have distinguished juveniles from adults in many aspects of the
law, revealing much about society’s expectations for the responsibility of juve-
niles for their actions.87  All states but two have established a uniform age of
majority of eighteen or above.88  No state allows minors under eighteen either to
vote or to sit on a jury.89  Only four states allow minors under eighteen to marry
without parental consent; only fourteen states allow minors under eighteen to
consent to medical treatment; and only seventeen states allow minors under
eighteen to drive automobiles without parental consent.90  Forty-two states pre-
vent minors under eighteen from purchasing pornographic materials, and in
those states where gambling is legal, minors under eighteen are generally not
allowed to participate.91  The restrictions that society has placed on minors un-
der the age of eighteen reflect “the simple truth derived from communal expe-
rience that juveniles as a class have not the level of maturation and responsibil-
ity that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full participation in the
rights and duties of modern life.”92
82. See Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 3, 5-6 (1997).
83. See id.
84. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 722; Spring, supra note 44, at 1358.
85. See Elsea, supra note 77, at 137.
86. See id. at 138.
87. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 395.
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D. Supreme Court Jurisprudence for the Juvenile Death Penalty
Until about twenty years ago, the legal system in the United States had not
really addressed the issue of the imposition of the death penalty on offenders
who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed the offense at
issue.  Almost no state statutes specifically imposed the death penalty on juve-
nile offenders, and few trial courts were ever presented with the question of
whether such action could be taken.93  The first case in the post-Furman Su-
preme Court death penalty decisions even to note that an issue existed regard-
ing the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders was
the 1981 case of Eddings v. Oklahoma.94  However, the Court sidestepped that
direct question by reaching its decision on other grounds, namely that courts
had a duty to consider all mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial.95  The Court again passed up the opportunity to consider the consti-
tutionality issue when it decided Jack v. Kemp96 in 1987, although Justice Powell
questioned the constitutionality of imposing such a punishment on a seventeen-
year-old offender and was concerned by the majority’s refusal to make a deci-
sion on that issue.97  That same year, however, the Court took the opportunity to
address the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on a juvenile who
was fifteen years old at the time of his offense in Thompson v. Oklahoma.98  The
Court addressed the same issue with respect to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
offenders the following year in Stanford v. Kentucky.99
1. Eddings v. Oklahoma.  In Eddings v. Oklahoma,100 the Court was
presented for the first time with the opportunity to determine whether a death
sentence could be constitutionally imposed on a juvenile offender, but it
declined to reach that issue.  Eddings was sixteen at the time he murdered a
highway patrol officer, and although Oklahoma law required the trial court to
consider all mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase, the Court did not
consider any evidence of Eddings’ age or his “unhappy upbringing and
emotional disturbance.”101  Following the direction of the Lockett Court, which
required “that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death,”102 the Court vacated the death sentence for failure to
consider all mitigating circumstances.  Although the majority never considered
93. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 57.
94. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
95. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 58.
96. 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
97. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 58.
98. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
99. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
100. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
101. Id. at 106-09.
102. Id. at 104, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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the constitutionality of the sentence as imposed on a sixteen-year-old offender,
the four dissenting justices would have addressed the ultimate constitutional
issue and rejected any constitutional bar on executing juveniles who committed
such offenses at the age of sixteen.103
2. Thompson v. Oklahoma.  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court
addressed the question of “whether the execution of [a death] sentence would
violate the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ because petitioner was only fifteen years old at the time of his
offense.”104  The trial court had certified Thompson to be tried as an adult based
on its conclusion “that there are virtually no reasonable prospects for
rehabilitation of William Wayne Thompson within the juveniles system.”105
Thompson, fifteen at the time of his offense, was found guilty of “actively
participat[ing] in the brutal murder of his former brother-in-law” in concert
with three older persons.106
Although the plurality held that executing a fifteen-year-old offender was
unconstitutional, the ruling was the result of a four-justice plurality with
O’Connor adding the fifth vote and basing her opinion on different grounds.
Because the plurality saw the Court as the ultimate arbiter of the limits of cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it had to determine
whether imposing the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old offender would run
counter to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society,” the standard against which a punishment was judged cruel and
unusual.107  In determining whether this threshold was met, the plurality consid-
ered: (1) at what ages the different states would allow the imposition of the
death penalty; (2) how willing juries had been to impose the death penalty on
juveniles when the law permitted such a punishment; and (3) the opinions of
other nations and informed organizations about imposing the death penalty on
juvenile offenders.  The plurality found that, because eighteen of the thirty-
seven states permitting capital punishment required defendants to be at least
sixteen years old at the time of the offense, it was reasonable to assume the exis-
tence of a national consensus against imposing the death penalty on fifteen-
year-old offenders.108  According to the plurality, the infrequency with which ju-
ries sentenced fifteen-year-old offenders to death demonstrated that this sen-
tence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.109  In addition, the plurality
103. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 58.
104. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-19 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (footnote
omitted).
105. Id. at 819-20.
106. Id. at 819.
107. Id. at 821 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (War-
ren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
108. See id. at 848-49 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
109. See id. at 832 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (“During the years 1982 through 1986 an average
of over 16,000 persons were arrested for willful criminal homicide . . . each year.  Of that group of
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
Page 133: Summer 2000] KIDS WHO KILL 145
noted that a substantial number of foreign countries, including West Germany,
France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and the Soviet Union, expressly prohibited
the death penalty for juveniles.110
The plurality then reviewed the unique ways in which Oklahoma law treated
children under the age of sixteen.  Fifteen-year-olds were subject to many legal
restrictions.  They were not allowed to vote, to serve on a jury, to marry, or to
gamble without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes.111  Unless
the offender was sixteen or seventeen years old and had been charged with
murder or another similar felony, Oklahoma law did not hold juveniles under
the age of eighteen criminally responsible for their offenses.112  The only other
civil or criminal statute that treated a juvenile under the age of sixteen as an
adult was the state statute used to get the special certification to transfer
Thompson to the adult criminal court.113  Oklahoma’s legal restrictions sup-
ported the idea that “the normal fifteen-year-old is not prepared to assume the
full responsibilities of an adult.”114  If a fifteen-year-old is not prepared to as-
sume the responsibilities of a normal adult, the plurality reasoned, then a fif-
teen-year-old should not be held to the same standard of conduct or subjected
to the same severity of punishment as a normal adult.  The plurality viewed
youth as:
more than a chronological fact.  It is a time and a condition of life when a person may
be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.  Our history is replete
with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gener-
ally are less mature and responsible than adults.115
Because fifteen-year-olds lack the responsibility and maturity of adults, the
plurality concluded that the traditional reasons justifying the imposition of the
death penalty—retribution and deterrence—did not apply.116  The plurality
found the goal of retribution to be inapplicable “given the lesser culpability of
the juvenile offender, the teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary
obligations to its children.”117  Similarly, deterrence did not apply in this context
because, even if the fifteen-year-old knew that other offenders of his or her age
had been executed for similar crimes, most teens would never consider the pos-
sibility they would be the one caught, let alone executed.118  The plurality felt
that “it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punishment
that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who
may be deterred by the harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may le-
82,094 persons, 1,393 were sentenced to death.  Only 5 of them, including the petitioner in this case,
were less than 16 years old at the time of the offense.”).
110. See id. at 832 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
111. See id. at 832 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
112. See id. at 824 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
113. See id.  (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
114. Id. at 824-25 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 834 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
116. See id. at 836-37 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 836-37 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
118. See id. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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gitimately take a retributive stance.”119  Without the justification of retribution
or deterrence, the plurality found that imposing the death penalty on fifteen-
year-old offenders would be “‘nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering’ and thus an unconstitutional punishment” un-
der the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.120
Justice O’Connor’s independent concurrence provided the last vote needed
to reverse Thompson’s death sentence, but she did not agree with the reasoning
of the plurality opinion.  O’Connor believed that when a state legislature, like
Oklahoma’s, did not set a minimum age for imposing the death penalty, the
Court could not conclude that it approved of executing young offenders.121  She
considered it possible that the legislature had simply neglected to consider the
fact that fifteen-year-olds would be subject to the death penalty when it created
the state’s statutory transfers to adult court.122  Because she felt that one of the
most important themes in the jurisprudence of the death penalty was the “need
for special care and deliberation in decisions that may lead to the imposition of
that sanction,”123 O’Connor concluded that “petitioners and others who were
below the age of sixteen at the time of their offense may not be executed under
the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at
which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.”124
Scalia, writing for three dissenters, disagreed with virtually every point as-
serted by the plurality.125  He did not believe the Eighth Amendment was cre-
ated to prevent the imposition of the death penalty, nor did he believe that the
different state capital punishment statutes established a national consensus re-
garding the minimum age for imposing the death penalty.  126  To Scalia, the fact
that juries rarely imposed sentences on people under the age of sixteen did not
reflect a new constitutional standard, but rather, the fact that people considered
the death penalty an extreme punishment that should be reserved for the most
serious of crimes.127  Finally, Scalia did not believe that “a majority of the small
and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this Court” should be
responsible for determining society’s evolving standards of decency when soci-
ety itself, through its elected representatives, was capable of making that de-
termination.128  If executing fifteen-year-old offenders violates society’s evolving
119. Id. at 825 n.23 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
121. See id. at 856 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 857-58.
125. At the time of this decision, Justice Powell had retired, but his spot had not yet been filled. As a
result, there were only eight justices on the Court.  See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra
note 51, at 60.
126. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 870-71 (finding “no justification . . . for converting a statistical rarity of occurrence
into an absolute constitutional ban”).
128. Id. at 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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standards of decency, Scalia reasoned, the legislature, as the representative of
the people, would make that determination.
3. Stanford v. Kentucky.  One year after Thompson, in Stanford v.
Kentucky,129 the Court dealt with a similar issue, but this time the petitioners
were sixteen and seventeen years old at the times of their offenses.130  This time,
however, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court failed to find
either death sentence to be contrary to “the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.” 131  As a result, the plurality did not
find either sentence to be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.  After the juvenile court determined that it would be in
“the best interest of petitioner and the community” for Stanford (seventeen at
the time of his offense) to be tried as an adult given his repetitive delinquent
behavior and the seriousness of his crime, he was convicted of “murder, first
degree sodomy, first degree robbery, and receiving stolen property.”132  Wilkins
(sixteen at the time of his offense) pled guilty to charges of “first degree
murder, armed criminal action, and carrying a concealed weapon.”133  He was
certified to be sentenced as an adult due to the “viciousness, force and violence
of the alleged crime, [his own] maturity, and the failure of the juvenile justice
system to rehabilitate him after previous delinquent acts.”134
As it had in Thompson, the plurality first looked to legislatures and juries to
see whether a national consensus existed either in support of, or in opposition
to, the imposition of the death penalty on offenders of these ages.  Because sev-
eral states had expressly required that juvenile offenders be either sixteen or
seventeen years old before they could be sentenced to death, the plurality
placed the “heavy burden” of establishing a national consensus against impos-
ing such a sentence on the petitioners.135  The plurality did not find that the peti-
tioners met that burden.  Executions of sixteen- or seventeen-year-old offenders
had not been as rare as executions of fifteen-year-olds, which had been an im-
portant factor in Thompson.136  Neither the existence of state capital punishment
statutes requiring offenders to be eighteen years of age, the federal death pen-
alty’s eighteen-years-old floor for certain drug-related offenses, nor “society’s
apparent skepticism” in actually sentencing sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to
death, was sufficient to establish the requisite national consensus.137
The plurality declined to use the proportionality analysis adopted in
Thompson, claiming that the Court had “never invalidated a punishment on
129. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
130. Stanford v. Kentucky was consolidated with Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
131. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
132. Id. at 365-66 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
133. Id. at 367 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 367 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 373 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
136. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 60.
137. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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[that] basis alone.”138  As a result, the plurality did not attempt to assess whether
the punishment imposed was disproportionate either to the crime committed, or
to the criminal culpability of the defendant..  Nor would the plurality investigate
whether the punishment contributed to the acceptable goals of retribution and
deterrence.139  According to the plurality, “it is not this Court but the citizenry of
the United States” who must determine whether a punishment is cruel and un-
usual.140  Because the plurality could “discern[] neither a historical nor a modern
societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any per-
son who murders at 16 or 17 years of age . . . such punishment did not offend
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”141
Justice O’Connor once again provided the final vote needed to support the
plurality’s decision but wrote a separate concurrence.  Using the same criteria
as she had in Thompson, O’Connor reviewed the state statutes dealing with
capital punishment and found that every legislature which considered the issue
specifically required a defendant to be at least sixteen years of age or older be-
fore imposing a capital punishment.142  As a result, she concluded that “it is suf-
ficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the imposition of capital pun-
ishment on sixteen- or seventeen-year-old capital murderers.”143
Justice Brennan’s dissent closely followed the analytical framework set forth
in Justice Steven’s plurality opinion in Thompson.144  Brennan found that most
legislatures, juries, informed organizations,145 and foreign nations opposed capi-
tal punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.146  Brennan also
found that executing sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders “fail[ed] to satisfy
two well-established and independent Eighth Amendment requirements—that
the punishment not be disproportionate, and that it make a contribution to the
acceptable goals of punishment.”147  Brennan believed that juveniles “very gen-
erally lack that degree of blameworthiness” that he found to be “a constitu-
tional prerequisite for the imposition of capital punishments under our prece-
dents concerning the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle.”148  Despite
the fact that individual consideration was given to the offenders’ youth and cul-
pability at the time they were transferred to adult court, Brennan did not be-
lieve that this policy singled out “exceptional individuals whose level of respon-
138. Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
139. See id. (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 378 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
142. See id. at 381 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part).
143. Id.
144. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 62.
145. Brennan cites the American Bar Association, the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges, and the American Law Institute as organizations opposing the death penalty for 16- and
17-year-olds.  See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 390-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 402-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sibility is more developed than that of their peers” for the death penalty.149  Be-
cause Brennan believed that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds lack the culpabil-
ity that makes a crime extreme enough to warrant the death penalty, the re-
tributive goal of capital punishment would not be served.150  Similarly, because
Brennan did not believe that sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds acted as rational
beings, thinking through the gains and losses of their actions before proceeding,
he did not believe that the goal of deterrence would be met.151  Therefore, Bren-
nan concluded that taking a life of a defendant who under the age of eighteen at
the time of the offense was forbidden under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment.  He would have set the minimum consti-
tutional age at eighteen.152
E. The Current Status of the Juvenile Death Penalty in Legislatures
Currently, thirty-eight states and the federal government authorize the
death penalty as an acceptable form of punishment for certain acts of murder.153
Fifteen of those states have expressly established eighteen as the minimum age
for imposing the death penalty, and four have established seventeen as the
minimum age.154  Florida’s Supreme Court recently held that the state constitu-
tion requires offenders to be at least seventeen before they can be sentenced to
death.155  Nine states have expressly required offenders to be at least sixteen
years old, and while the remaining ten states do not set a minimum age,
Thompson’s constitutional minimum of sixteen years of age is controlling.156  Al-
though the death penalty-free jurisdictions of Iowa, Massachusetts, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have proposed imposition of the death penalty, no action has
been taken yet, and it remains unclear whether a juvenile death penalty would
be included.157
With the growing emphasis on harsh punishments for juvenile offenders,
state legislatures seem to be moving toward lowering the minimum age required
for imposing a death sentence.  Crime prevention and control have been hot
political platforms in the 1990s, and legislatures have been working to create
tougher punishments for those they deem to pose a danger to society.  Inun-
149. Id. at 403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 403-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today, supra note 43.
154. See id.
155. See Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999); see also Jo Becker, Court Raises Execution Age
to Seventeen, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 9, 1999, at 1A (reporting that in a divided 4-3 opinion, the
court found it cruel and unusual punishment to impose a penalty so infrequently handed out.  The state
had not executed a 16-year-old in over half a century).
156. See Streib, Juvenile Death Penalty Today, supra note 43.  Those expressly requiring an offender
to be sixteen include: Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming.  Those whose minimum age is set by the constitutional default include: Arizona,
Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Vir-
ginia.  See id.
157. See id.
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dated by media accounts of children who kill, voters seem tired of talking about
rehabilitation and want immediate action.158  One response has been to impose
“more punitive sentences by developing laws that make it easier to transfer ju-
veniles (in some states, to ‘waive,’ ‘certify,’ or ‘bind over’) for trial in criminal
court rather than juvenile court.”159  Some state legislatures are replacing judi-
cial waiver, the traditional method of transferring juveniles in which an individ-
ual determination is made regarding the maturity of each offender, with manda-
tory statutory exclusions, which result in automatic adult criminal court
jurisdiction for the most serious offenses.160  Other states are giving prosecutors
more discretion in choosing the court in which to file, without requiring the
consent of the court or even an individual hearing before prosecuting juvenile
offenders in adult court for serious felonies.161  The age at which juveniles can be
transferred out of the juvenile court system, with its emphasis on rehabilitation,
and into the more punitive adult criminal court has been steadily declining.  In
some states, juveniles as young as thirteen, ten, or even seven may be trans-
ferred to adult criminal court, and some state legislatures have not even pro-
scribed a minimum age for transfer.162
In an attempt to establish reputations as being “tough on crime,” many poli-
ticians have used the death penalty as a political tool.163  Feeding on the mixture
of public outrage and fear that has resulted from recent high-profile juvenile
crimes, such as the school massacres that began in October 1997, politicians
have proposed drastic measures that will teach juvenile offenders a lesson.164
One drastic measure has been pursuing the death penalty for increasingly
younger offenders.165  Criticizing a recent decision by the Florida Supreme
Court166 that executing sixteen-year-olds constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the state Constitution, Republican Florida State Senator.  Locke
Burt pointed out that “this Legislature has said that you can try someone as an
adult if they are as young as fourteen, and if you can do that, they ought to be
subject to the same penalties as adults,” implying that he would support the
158. See Elsea, supra note 77, at 136.
159. Grisso, supra note 82, at 3, 5.
160. See id. at 5.
161. See id. at 6.
162. See id. at 6.
163. See Amnesty International Report, AMR 51/24/98 § 4 (visited Sept. 19, 2000) <www.amnesty-
usa.org/amnesty/rightsforall/juvenile/dp/section4.html> [hereinafter Amnesty Report].  For example,
according to Amnesty International, Governor Pete Wilson stated that he was in favor of imposing the
death penalty on children as young as 14.  The governor of New Mexico called for 13-year-olds to be
subjected to the death penalty, and in Los Angeles, a district attorney supported the death penalty for
children of all ages.
164. See id.
165. See Andrew F. Garofalo, “Brennan v. State: The Constitutionality of Executing Sixteen-Year-
Old offenders in Florida,” 24 NOVA L. REV. 855 n. 89 (2000); see also LeCray v. State, 533 So. 2d 750,
757 (Fla. 1988) (discussing the legislative history of the statutory provisions in Florida which permit
children as young as fourteen to be tried as adults).
166. See Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).
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death penalty for juveniles as young as fourteen.167  Senator Burt is not alone.
After the shootings in Jonesboro, Arkansas, a Texas legislator complained that
that his state could not execute an eleven-year-old, and announced his intention
to remedy the problem by lowering the age for imposing the death penalty to
eleven.168  In 1996, more than 100 years after the state’s last execution of a juve-
nile offender, the governor of New Mexico announced his support for imposing
the death penalty on juveniles as young as thirteen.169  The Governor of Califor-
nia has also announced his personal support for a juvenile death penalty, spe-
cifically calling for the minimum age to be set at fourteen.170  Perhaps even more
startling is the opinion of a Los Angeles District Attorney who has been quoted
as supporting the death penalty for children “no matter what their age.”171
Judges, tired of the violent offenses they face every day, have also begun to
come down harder on juvenile offenders.  The sentences being handed down
are increasingly punitive and show less concern for the prospects of juvenile re-
habilitation.  For example, in 1999, when sentencing a seventeen-year-old to
serve fourteen years in prison for the murder of his father, Judge Thomas V.
Warren said, “I’m not concerned about recidivism or rehabilitation.  The matter
of concern is punishment.”172  Florida Supreme Court Justice Charles Wells, dis-
senting from the court’s opinion that executing sixteen-year-olds violated the
state constitution, pointed out that “the defendant in this case did not commit a
child-like crime.”173  He would have allowed the death sentence to stand.174  Al-
though some trial court judges seem willing to impose death sentences on juve-
niles under the age of sixteen, despite the violation of Thompson, none of those
cases has survived state supreme court review.  For example, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that Thompson prevented the execution of fifteen-
year-old offenders in State v. Stone (1988) and Dugar v. State (1993), as did the
Indiana Supreme Court in Cooper v. State (1989), and the Alabama Supreme
Court in Flowers v. State (1991).175
F. How the International Community Views Juvenile Executions
Since the end of the World War II, the international community has acted in
steady opposition to the juvenile death penalty.  More than fifty foreign coun-
tries, including nearly all of Western Europe, have formally abolished the death
penalty or limited its use to exceptional crimes, such as treason.176  The interna-
167. Becker, supra note 155, at 1A.
168. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 21.
169. See Amnesty Report, supra note 163, at § 4.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Wynne W. Wasson, Teen-ager To Serve 14 Years—He Was Convicted of Killing His Father,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 1999, at B1.
173. Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999).
174. See id. at 25.
175. See State v. Stone, 535 So. 2d 362 (La. 1998); Dugar v. State, 615 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1993); Flow-
ers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala. 1991); Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
176. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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tional community’s rejection of the juvenile death penalty is based on the belief
that juveniles are less responsible for their actions than adults and more likely
to be responsive to rehabilitation.177
International treaties on this subject demonstrate an almost universal
agreement that “[t]he imposition of the death penalty on persons who have not
attained full physical or emotional maturity is recognized as inappropriate and
inhumane, because it permanently denies the child any chance of rehabilitation
or reform.”178  The first treaty to forbid such executions was the Fourth Geneva
Convention, adopted in 1949.179  The United States signed and ratified this
treaty regulating wartime behavior without claiming any special exemptions, as
it did with later treaties.180  The next international treaty dealing with juvenile
executions to be signed by the United States was the American Convention on
Human Rights, which prohibited the execution of juvenile offenders under the
age of eighteen.181  Although this treaty was signed by United States in 1979, it
was never ratified, largely due to the prohibition on juvenile executions.182  For
similar reasons, the United States has not even signed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which was adopted by the United Nations in November
1989 and has been joined by 164 countries.183  In 1992, the United States ratified
an international treaty opposing the juvenile death penalty, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,184 with one important caveat, the U.S.
reserved “the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital
punishment on any person other than a pregnant woman duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, includ-
ing such punishment for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age.”185
A number of regional human rights agreements also prohibit the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.  The American Convention on Hu-
man Rights186 provides that capital punishment “shall not be imposed on persons
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over
70 years of age.”187  Although the United States signed but did not ratify this
treaty, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”)
177. See Frey, supra note 17, at 80-81.
178. Id. at 81.
179. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 68,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560.
180. See Frey, supra note 17, at 80-81.
181. See American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
182. See Frey, supra note 17, at 80-81.
183. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37a, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  See Frey,
supra note 17, at 80 (“Article 37 of the convention provides that children under 18 convicted of crimes
shall not be subject to capital punishment, life imprisonment, torture or cruel and inhumane punish-
ment,” and calls for every child deprived of liberty be treated in a manner which takes into account the
needs of persons of his or her age.).
184. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
185. See Frey, supra note 17, at 81-82.
186. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4.5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
187. Frey, supra note 17, at 82.
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found the United States to be bound by the section entitled the American Dec-
laration on the Rights and Duties of Man (the “American Declaration”).188  In
1987, the Commission found that by leaving the issue of the juvenile death pen-
alty to the discretion of state officials, the United States had created a “patch-
work scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the punishment de-
pendent, not primarily on the nature of the crime committed, but on the
location where it was committed.”189  Because the executions of minors James
Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton in South Carolina and Texas, respectively, were
allowed to take place under this scheme, the United States had violated articles
1 and 2 of the American Declaration.190
Although the majority of the international community opposes the juvenile
death penalty, the United States is not alone when it permits the execution of
offenders who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of their crime.
According to Amnesty International, eight countries have documented execu-
tions of juveniles under eighteen in the period from 1985 to 1995, and it is pos-
sible that other similar executions have taken place without being docu-
mented.191  The number of juvenile offenders who have been executed may also
be greater than actually reported, because Amnesty International’s research fo-
cused on the age of juveniles at the time of their execution and did not take into
account those persons over eighteen who were executed for crimes they com-
mitted when they were under eighteen.192  Although it has been established that
juvenile executions have occurred in these countries, comparisons to the United
States are difficult to make because little is known about the offenders’ crimes
or the criminal process by which they were convicted.193
IV
WHY CHILDREN KILL
In order to create a system that deals effectively with children who kill—as
well as one that successfully prevents children from killing in the future—it is
important to understand what causes children to kill and why they should be
treated differently from adults who commit similar offenses.  Dealing with chil-
dren who kill “create[s] a serious dilemma for the criminal and juvenile justice
systems” because it is difficult both to determine the causes of juvenile homi-
cide and to reconcile the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders with society’s
desire for immediate and substantial punishment.194  Research in this area is
limited, and sample sizes are generally small.  Most of the available empirical
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 64.  In addition to the United
States, the countries that permit the execution of juvenile offenders include Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Ni-
geria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See EWING, supra note 60, at 13.
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data comes from anecdotal evidence, and results are often tainted by selection
bias:  The only juveniles studied are those referred for psychological or psychi-
atric evaluation and/or treatment.195  Despite these problems, it is apparent that
certain factors present in a child’s life increase the probability that that child
will eventually kill.  For example, a juvenile’s chances of committing murder are
twice as high if:  (1) his or her family has a history of criminal violence; (2) he or
she has a history of being abused; (3) he or she belongs to a gang; or (4) he or
she abuses alcohol or drugs.196  The probability that a child will commit murder
triples if: (1) he or she uses a weapon; (2) he or she has been arrested; (3) he or
she has a neurological problem that impairs thinking and feeling; or (4) he or
she has difficulties at school and has a poor attendance record.197  Rarely does
any single factor alone create a homicidal juvenile, but the presence of a combi-
nation of these factors makes it much more likely that a particular juvenile will
be pushed into violence.198
Two of the most important factors affecting juvenile violence are the child’s
home environment and the child’s relationship with his or her parents.  Ac-
cording to modern developmental science and theory, “human development
proceeds from attachment in the first year of life.”199  Children who kill have of-
ten failed to receive the love, support, or faith they needed in the first years of
their lives.200  As a result, these children have what Dr. James Garbarino201 calls
“damaged souls” and are “unable to connect with love to the world around
them.”202  These children “often lack the emotional fundamentals for becoming
a well-functioning member of society and are prone to become infected with
whatever social poisons are around them.  In short, they have trouble learning
the basics of empathy, sympathy, and caring.”203  They feel no connection to
their homes, their parents, or their surroundings, and so society’s social condi-
tions do not get “incorporated into the ways [the] kids think and feel about the
world, about their world, and about themselves.”204  Because they do not feel
connected to society, these children do not incorporate society’s definitions of
“right” and “wrong” into their daily lives.
Many children who kill come from broken homes.  Studies conducted as
early as 1942 have shown that a majority of homicidal juveniles (five out of six)
195. See id. at 13-14.
196. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 10 (citing R. Zager et al., Think about the Characteristics:
Homicidal Adolescents: A Replication,  67 PSYCHOL. REP. 1235-42 (1991)).
197. See id. (citing Zager et al., Think about the Characteristics: Homicidal Adolescents: A Replica-
tion,  67 PSYCHOL. REP. 1235-42 (1991)).
198. See id.
199. Id. at 38.
200. See id. at 36-38.
201. James Garbarino, Ph.D., is the Co-Director of the Family Life Development Center, Professor
of Human Development at Cornell University, and the author of LOST BOYS.
202. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 38.
203. Id. at 52.
204. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
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come from broken homes or homes plagued by serious marital problems.205
More recent studies have produced similar results.  According to a 1978 study,
thirty-three out of forty-five juvenile killers came from broken homes,206 and ac-
cording to another study done three years later, the proportion rose to seven
out of nine homicidal juveniles.207  Not all studies define a “broken home” in the
same way, however.  In one study, nine of the ten homicidal juveniles lived in a
broken home, defined as a home in which at least one parent had deserted the
family.208  In another study, a broken home was defined as one lacking both
natural parents, a situation present for twenty-three of the thirty-one juveniles
observed.209  The percentage of homes headed by single women is one of the
most powerful indicators of a community’s crime rates.210  Children raised by
single mothers in poor communities are “more likely to become school drop-
outs, be abused, use drugs, and become delinquent than those raised either in
two parent homes or by single parents with better economic resources.”211
However, a broken home is not always characterized with an absent parent; it
can also be a home with parents who are alcoholic and/or mentally ill.212  In one
study of juveniles on death row, nine out of fourteen had either an alcoholic
parent, a mentally ill parent, or a parent who had been hospitalized for psychi-
atric treatment,213 results that have been confirmed in other similar studies.214
A turbulent home life does more than simply deprive the child of the tools
needed to function in society; it shapes the way in which the child views the
world.  Often children who kill are exposed to violence at home, and as a result,
they learn that violence is an acceptable response to problematic situations.  In
fact, “[p]robably the single most consistent finding in the research on juvenile
homicide to date is that children and adolescents who kill, especially those who
kill family members, have generally witnessed and/or been directly victimized
by domestic violence.”215  According to a study of homicidally aggressive chil-
dren, nearly two-thirds (62%) of homicidal children lived in households where
205. See id. (citing Patterson, Psychiatric Study of Juveniles Involved in Homicide, 13 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 125 (1943)).
206. See id. (citing Rosner et al., Adolescents Accused of Murder and Manslaughter: A Five-Year De-
scriptive Study, 4 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 342, 345-46 (1978)).
207. See id. (citing Petti & Davidman, Homicidal School-Age Children: Cognitive Style and Demo-
graphic Features, 12 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 82, 85 (1981)).
208. See id. (citing McCarthy, Narcissism and the Self in Homicidal Adolescents, 38 AM. J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 19 (1978)).
209. See id. (citing Sorrels, Kids Who Kill, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 312, 317 (1977)).
210. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 771.
211. Id.
212. See EWING, supra note 60, at 21.
213. See id. (citing Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of
14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 587 (1998)).
214. See EWING, supra note 60, at 21.
215. Id. at 22.
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their fathers had been physically abusive to their mothers, as compared to only
thirteen percent of the non-homicidal children studied.216
Violence does not have to occur in the home to have an impact on a child’s
life; often the violence pervades the local community, especially when children
are living in low-income areas.  In 1993, Chicago-based psychiatrist Carl Bell
found that among students ranging from ages ten to nineteen years old, residing
in areas characterized by low incomes and moderate to extremely high crime
rates, three out of four had witnessed a robbery, stabbing, shooting, and/or
killing, more than a third (35%) had witnessed a stabbing or a shooting (39%),
and one in four had seen someone killed.217  Forty-five percent had seen more
than one violent incident, and many of the children knew the victims of the
crimes they observed.218  Children who witness domestic violence or violence in
their community exhibit symptoms similar to the post-traumatic stress disorder
experienced by children living in war-torn countries like Mozambique and
Cambodia.  U.S. inner-city youth exposed to this level of violence “lose interest
in the world and try to avoid anything that reminds them of the event; they
manifest feelings of estrangement, constriction in affect and cognition, memory
impairment, phobias, and impairment in performing daily activities.”219  As they
detach themselves from the violence around them, children come to accept
violence as natural and inconsequential.  Eventually children who witness vio-
lence see violent and risky behavior as “unthreatening, even appealing, because
it aligns the child with the aggressor instead of the victim.”220
Exposure to violence not only teaches children that violence constitutes ac-
ceptable behavior; it can also cause physical changes in the child’s brain.
“[C]onstant exposure to pain and violence can make their brain’s system of
stress hormones unresponsive, like a keypad that has been pushed so often it
just stops working.”221  As a result, children who have been repeatedly exposed
to violence typically display a lack of empathy and a “practically nonexistent”
sensitivity to the world.222  These adolescents do not respond to punishment be-
cause nothing hurts; “[t]heir ability to feel, to react, has died and so has their
conscience.”223  These children do not understand that emotional pain can result
216. See id. (quoting Lewis et al., Homicidally Aggressive Young Children: Neuropsychiatric and
Experiential Correlates, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 148 (1983)).
217. See Hattie Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies to Prevent Youth
Violence, 103 YALE L.J. 1885, 1896 (1994) (citing Carl C. Bell & Esther J. Jenkings, Community Vio-
lence and Children on Chicago’s South Side, PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 46, 49).
218. See id. (citing Carl C. Bell & Esther J. Jenkings, Community Violence and Children on Chi-
cago’s South Side, PSYCHIATRY, Feb. 1993, at 46, 49).
219. Id. at 1897 (quoting JAMES GARBARINO ET AL., CHILDREN IN DANGER: COPING WITH THE
CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNITY VIOLENCE (1992)).
220. Id.
221. Sharon Begley, Why the Young Kill, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 1999, at 32; see also STEVEN LEVITT,
JUVENILE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W6169,
1981).
222. See id.
223. Id.
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from their actions.224  Often these children abuse animals, seeing their suffering
as funny, amusing, or not seeing the animals’ suffering at all.225  For example,
both Kip Kinkel, the fifteen-year-old who killed his parents and schoolmates in
Springfield, Oregon, and Luke Woodham, responsible for the Pearl, Mississippi,
shootings, had histories of animal abuse.226  Woodham, for example, had previ-
ously beaten his dog with a club, wrapped it in a bag and set it on fire.227
Children not only observe violence in the home and in the community; too
often they experience it.  “There is a clear and undisputed nexus between child
abuse and aggression.  Although not all abused children grow up to be abusers,
there is a strong correlation that those who are seriously abused become the
most violent members of society.”228  This strong correlation between child
abuse and juvenile homicide has been demonstrated in a number of published
case studies.229  For example in a study of fourteen juveniles on death row,
twelve “had been ‘brutally’ abused physically,” and five had been sodomized by
older family members.230  Looking outside the small sample of juvenile death
row inmates, fifty-five percent of the homicidally aggressive children studied
had been physically abused.231  The results of this study are not unique.  Looking
at juveniles hospitalized for psychiatric treatment, six of the ten homicidal juve-
niles had been subjected to “parental brutality,” while only one of ten non-
homicidal juveniles had such experiences.232  In addition, four of the homicidal
juveniles had been “seduced” by a parent, while none of the non-homicidal ju-
veniles had.233  Experiencing violence leads a child to resort to violence because
he or she “comes to understand how the world works through the lens of his
own abuse.”234  For example, while on trial for the murder of his father, Jacob
Wilson, then seventeen years old, testified that he lived in fear of being beaten
during his father’s rages, which were brought on by heavy bouts of drinking and
intensified by his father’s use of cocaine.235  When the violence at home became
too much for him to bear, Wilson responded to the situation in the only manner
he knew how: with violence.
224. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 54.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See Begley, supra note 221, at 32.
228. Johnson, supra note 34, at 767.
229. See EWING, supra note 60, at 22 (citing Sherl & Mack, A Study of Adolescent Matricide, 5 J.
AM. ACAD. OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 559 (1966)); Duncan & Duncan, Murder in the Family: A Study of
Some Homicidal Adolescents, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1498 (1971); Malmquist, Premonitory Signs of
Homicidal Juvenile Aggression, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 461 (1971)).
230. Id. at 23 (quoting Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics
of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 584 (1998)).
231. See id. (quoting Lewis et al., Homicidally Aggressive Young Children: Neuropsychiatric and
Experiential Correlates, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 148 (1983)).
232. See id.  (quoting Sendi & Blomgren, A Comparative Study of Predictive Criteria in the Predispo-
sition of Homicidal Adolescents, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 423, 425 (1975)).
233. See id.  (quoting Sendi & Blomgren, A Comparative Study of Predictive Criteria in the Predispo-
sition of Homicidal Adolescents, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 423, 425 (1975)).
234. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 80.
235. See Wasson, supra note 172, at B1.
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Like children who are victims of physical abuse, children who suffer from
emotional abuse erect barriers around themselves to prevent themselves from
feeling pain.  Abused children “frequently have a pervasive sense of helpless-
ness that results from feeling trapped in a situation from which they cannot es-
cape.”236  Abuse causes emotional dissociation, otherwise known as the famous
“fight or flight” response.237  If they are unable to flee physically, these children
flee psychologically by  “shut[ting] down emotionally and disconnect[ing] them-
selves from their feelings so that they don’t have to feel them anymore.  It’s a
survival strategy . . . . By cutting off or disowning the feelings that threaten to
overwhelm them, children can survive traumatic threats.”238  Once a child learns
to bury his emotions in the face of violence, that skill remains with the child for
the rest of his life, preventing him from fully confronting the consequences of
his actions.239  It is not that the child does not feel anything; he feels too much—
so much that he can only survive if the feelings are deeply buried.240  Dr. Gar-
barino uses the story of John to illustrate how children develop the skill of dis-
association.241  John learned to disassociate himself from pain when he was six
years old, and that skill stayed with him for his entire life, preventing him from
feeling anything while committing horrific violent acts.  Once, when he was six,
John woke up at three in the morning to find his stepfather sneaking into the
house following a big fight he had had with John’s mother.  John handed his
stepfather a big knife as he was ordered.  All he remembers after that is
screaming, feeling “pee running down his leg onto his foot,” and “the red
walls.”242  Years after his stepfather stabbed his mother to death in her bedroom,
as he himself awaits execution for stabbing a fifty-year-old woman to death in
her bedroom, John cannot remember how he felt when he committed the mur-
der.243
Besides disassociation, another survival skill learned by abused children is
hypervigilance.  A hypervigilant child is always “acutely aware of his or her en-
vironment and remains on the alert for any signs of danger.”244  As a result of
this constant environmental monitoring, a hypervigilant child will react—some-
times violently—to changes in people or situations that other children would ig-
nore.245  Hypervigilance is not simply a learned behavior; it also results from
236. Jamie Heather Sacks, Comment, A New Age of Understanding: Allowing Self-Defense Claims
For Battered Children Who Kill Their Abusers, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 349, 355-56
(1993).
237. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 85.
238. Id.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 86.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 85–86.
244. Sacks, supra note 236, at 356 (quoting Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
the Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 103-04 (1987)).
245. See id. (quoting Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the
Battered Child, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 103-04 (1987)).
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
Page 133: Summer 2000] KIDS WHO KILL 159
physical changes in the brain that alter a child’s ability to react rationally to cer-
tain life situations.  According to Dr. Bruce Perry of Baylor College of Medi-
cine:
A child who suffers repeated ‘hits’ of stress—abuse, neglect, terror—experiences
physical changes in his brain . . . . The incessant flood of stress chemicals tends to reset
the brain’s system of fight-of-flight hormones, putting them on hair-trigger alert.  The
result is the kid who shows impulsive aggression, the kid who pops the classmate who
disses him.246
For example, the Chicago Daily Herald reported that “[a] one-time honor roll
student at Palatine High School may have stabbed a 78-year-old neighbor, po-
lice said, because he believed the man disrespected him by giving him a dirty
look.”247  These children become hypersensitive to perceived injustices,248 and
use the only means they know—violence—to remedy the situation.
Physical and/or emotional abuse is not the only way a parent can perma-
nently damage his or her child’s development.  Often children who kill suffer
deeply from a parent’s emotional neglect.  Research has shown that a child’s
emotional tie to his or her parents is one of the most influential factors contrib-
uting to antisocial behavior, including homicidal tendencies.249  Neglected chil-
dren often feel that their parents have abandoned them.  A belief that their
parents do not want them causes the children deep feelings of shame.250  The
shame they experience “begets covert depression, which begets rage, which be-
gets violence.”251
Parental neglect has also been shown to create physical problems, such as
the impairment of the development of the brain’s cortex, which controls feel-
ings of belonging and attachment.252  Children who suffer from neglect fail to
develop—or even lose—the neural circuits that control the capacity to feel and
form healthy relationships.253  Neglected children often feel that they do not
matter, and violence becomes a way—better than none at all—to gain atten-
tion.254
Physical and neurological brain damage, not uncommon among homicidal
juveniles, causes many problems.255  Lesions in the frontal lobe of the brain have
been shown to induce apathy and distort judgment and emotion.256  In a study of
fifty murderers, psychiatrist Daniel Amen found that the structure in the brain
246. Begley, supra note 221, at 32.
247. Steve Warmbir & Sandra Del Re, From Honor Role to Murder Rap, CHICAGO DAILY
HERALD, Sept. 14, 1999, at 1.
248. See Begley, supra note 221, at 32.
249. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 770.
250. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 44.
251. Id.
252. See Begley, supra note 221, at 32.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See EWING, supra note 60, at 19.
256. See Begley, supra note 221, at 32.
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called the cingulate gyrus (CG) was consistently hyperactive.257  When the CG is
thus impaired, a person cannot fluidly transmit his or her thoughts through the
brain, and as a result, that person gets stuck on one thought.258  Amen also found
that in many of the murderers, the prefrontal cortex, the brain’s supervisor, was
sluggish.  Either of these conditions can result in “violent thoughts [getting]
stuck in the murderers’ brains without any supervisor to prevent the thoughts
from becoming actions.”259
Other studies have found similar correlations between violent behavior and
physical brain damage.  According to Charles Ewing, thirty years ago two-thirds
of the juvenile killers tested had abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG) trac-
ings.260  A more recent study found that every one of the fourteen juveniles on
death row “had histories and/or symptoms consistent with brain damage.” 261
Eight had injuries severe enough to result in hospitalization for indention of the
cranium, and nine had documented neurological abnormalities.262
In addition to suffering from physical brain damage, children who kill often
suffer from a range of mild to severe personality disorders.263  Most personality
disorders affecting children who kill are “characterized by inflexible, maladap-
tive ‘patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and
oneself.”264  Some of the most common include antisocial, paranoid, avoidant,
and dependent behavior.265  A child suffering from any of these disorders is of-
ten unable to control the aggressive impulses that result in episodic explosive
outbursts.266  According to one study, “many if not most juveniles who kill have
prehomicidal histories of antisocial behavior, reflected in records of arrests and
criminal convictions.”267  Among the thirty-seven juvenile killers in this study,
twenty-nine (78%) had prior criminal convictions.  Of these, twelve (32%) had
two or three convictions, and the rest had between four and eight convictions.268
Other studies show a similar connection between homicidal juveniles and per-
sonality disorder.  One found that thirty-one out of forty-five (69%) homicidal
257. See Begley, supra note 221, at 32 (citing Daniel Amen et al., Visualizing the Firestorms in the
Brain:  An Inside Look at the Clinical and Psychological Connections Between Drugs and Violence Us-
ing Brain SPECT Imaging, 29 PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS  307-19 (1997)).
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See EWING, supra note 60, at 19.
261. Id. at 19 (citing Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of
14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 584 (1998)).
262. See id.
263. See id. at 17.  Personality disorders need to be distinguished from major mental disorders,
which are less common among homicidal juveniles.
264. Id. at 16 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed. 1987)); see also id. at 19.
265. See id. at 17.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 24 (quoting Fiddes, A Survey of Adolescent Murder in Scotland, 4 J. ADOLESCENCE 47,
58 (1981)).
268. See id.
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juveniles observed had previously been arrested,269 while another found that
nine out of ten homicidal juveniles had extensive histories of fighting and other
antisocial behavior prior to killing.270
Homicidal children often exhibit serious trouble in school, as a result of low
intelligence and/or a lack of focus and motivation.  Failure at school not only
diminishes opportunities for later employment and higher education, it also fos-
ters another environment where the child does not fit in.271  Sometimes academic
failure results from a below average intelligence, meaning that the child has an
IQ score around eighty, just above the level that is considered mentally re-
tarded.272  Sometimes academic failure results from learning disorders.273  Con-
firming earlier studies that many juveniles on death row suffer from learning
disorders, a 1988 study found that “ten out of fourteen [juveniles on death row]
had major learning problems, that only three were reading at grade level, and
that three had never even learned to read until they were incarcerated on death
row.”274  Sometimes children fail academically because they have neither the
time nor the motivation to succeed.275  When children must constantly defend
themselves from outside dangers that threaten their survival, they do not have
the time or energy for less urgent tasks, such as learning to read, write, and do
arithmetic, and learning about geography, history, and science.276
Poverty is another factor that often contributes to the violent behavior of
children who kill.  Living in poverty reduces the amount of parental supervision
that a child receives.  Parents cannot provide the supervision and guidance that
families with better resources have if their attention is monopolized by finding
money for rent, food, doctor’s bills, and other necessities.277  Adults living in
poverty are also more likely to suffer from depression or substance abuse.278  In
addition to consuming a large percentage of the family income, these habits
create ineffective, harsh, or unresponsive parents,279 and set an example that
such behavior is acceptable.
Living in poverty affects the behavior of children as well, determining the
kinds of opportunities they will have and dictating the pressures they will face.280
269. See id. (quoting Rosner et al., Adolescents Accused of Murder and Manslaughter: A Five-Year
descriptive Study, 4 BULL. AM. ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY & LAW 342, 345-46 (1978)).
270. See id. (quoting McCarthy, Narcissism and the Self in Homicidal Adolescents, 38 AM. J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 19 (1978)).
271. See id. at 18.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 18-19.
274. Id. at 18-19 (citing Bender, Children and Adolescents Who have Killed, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
305-308 (1957); Patterson, Psychiatric Study of Juveniles Involved in Homicide, 13 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 125 (1943)).
275. See Ruttenberg, supra note 217, at 1897.
276. See id.
277. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 768.
278. See Ruttenberg, supra note 217, at 1895 (citing Jane D. McLeod & Michael J. Shanahan, Pov-
erty, Parenting and Children’s Mental Health, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 351, 357 (1993).
279. See id.
280. See id.
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
162 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
Children living in poverty may be forced to drop out of school to help support
the family, or they may chose to do so in the absence of effective parental su-
pervision.  Children turn to gangs to fill the emotional gaps left by a non-
existent family, and gang involvement often leads to criminality and violence.281
Gangs provide physical protection in the increasingly lawless world in which
poor children struggle to survive.282  The longer a child lives in poverty, the more
his or her opportunities for education and employment may slip away and the
greater the likelihood that he or she may become involved in violent crime.283
Many children who kill turn to drugs and alcohol.  A study of seventy-two
homicidal juveniles found that twenty-four (36%) regularly or heavily used al-
cohol, while twenty-nine (40%) regularly or heavily used drugs.284  A similar
study reported that two-thirds of the twelve homicidal juveniles observed had
histories of substance abuse.285  Substance abuse pushes children to violence in
two ways.  First, the actual consumption of drugs and/or alcohol encourages ag-
gressive behavior because using reduces the likelihood that the conventional
rules for social interaction will be followed.286  Second, the financial burden of
supporting a drug—or even an alcohol—habit often puts the child in situations
where violence becomes necessary.287  Researchers have found that “although
the extent of the connection between youth violence and these two categories of
heightened risk is unclear, the connection itself is undeniable.”288
Understanding why children kill is a complex problem because each child’s
experience is different.  In an attempt to find an easy solution to an increasing
rate of juvenile violence, politicians blame identifiable external social problems
and suggest that by remedying these outside factors, juvenile violence will dis-
appear.  One popular scapegoat is the media.  Because “a typical American
child can witness more images of death and destruction from the comfort of his
or her own living room than any cop or soldier witnesses in actuality in the line
of duty in a lifetime,”289 the American Psychological Association (“APA”) be-
lieves that the media has created a violent American culture that teaches chil-
dren that violence is an effective and accepted method of solving problems.290
Following the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
President Clinton encouraged the entertainment industry to stop marketing
281. See EWING, supra note 60, at 80-90 (discussing gang-related killings).
282. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 11.
283. See id.
284. See EWING, supra note 60, at 26 (quoting Cornell et al., Characteristics of Adolescents Charged
with Homicide: Review of 72 Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 11, 18-19 (1987)).
285. See EWING, supra note 60, at 26 (quoting Brandstadter-Palmer, Children Who Kill, paper pre-
sented at Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (Toronto, Aug. 1984)).
286. See Ruttenberg, supra note 217, at 1898.
287. See id.
288. Id. (citing OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, UNITED STATES
DEPTARTMENT OF JUSTICE, URBAN DELINQUENCY AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, INITIAL FINDINGS
REPORT 5, 11(1993).
289. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 108.
290. See id. (citing REASON TO HOPE: A PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON VIOLENCE AND YOUTH
(L.D. Eron et al. eds., 1994).
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products that glorify violence to children, “warning, however subt[ly], that gov-
ernment action could result if Hollywood does not voluntarily rein in some of
the ultra-violent films and games that the industry rates as not appropriate for
children under seventeen, and then markets precisely to that audience.”291  Al-
though no one has been able to establish a direct correlation between violent
juveniles and violent television, the APA assumes that there is a direct connec-
tion between the two.292  Without role models in the media, the APA believes
that juvenile violence will decline sharply.
However, no matter how much violence children observe in the media, kill-
ing requires a weapon in an American society:  Guns are too easily accessible.
Juveniles today “find themselves surrounded by tools which make acts of vio-
lence quick and easy.”293  Not only are guns available, but children are willing to
carry them.  The arrest rate for weapon possession among juveniles rose almost
63% between 1980 and 1990.294  In 1987, 64% of juvenile homicides involved the
use of guns, while in 1991 that figure rose to 78%.295  According to those who
believe gun accessibility is the problem, keeping guns out of children’s reach is
the solution.
As discussed above, many factors can contribute to children turning to vio-
lence and killing.  No list can completely account for every influence that may
move a child to violence, and no formula can be created to prevent it.  In deal-
ing with the problem of juvenile homicides, lawmakers must not only focus on
the external scapegoats currently condemned by popular opinion; they must
also look to the deeper problems that affect the lives of juveniles and their
families.296  In order to determine the best punishments and the most effective
preventative measures, it is not only necessary to understand what the different
variables are, but to realize that there is no set equation for producing a child
that kills.
V
PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Fundamental Differences Between Children and Adults
Perhaps the biggest problem with a system that allows sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-old children to be sentenced to death is its failure to recognize the
fundamental differences between children and adults.  Although many of the
mitigating circumstances presented on behalf of adults and juveniles facing the
291. Faye Foire & Melissa Healy, Clinton Urges Hollywood to Cut Violence, L.A. TIMES, May 11,
1999, at A1.
292. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 108.
293. Kathleen M. Heide, Why Kids Keep Killing: The Correlates, Causes and Challenge of Juvenile
Homicide, 7 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 43, 44 (1996).
294. See Ruttenberg, supra note 217, at 1899.
295. See id.
296. See infra Section VI.
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death penalty are the same—such as evidence of childhood abuse and exposure
to violence—an adult standing trial for murder has had time either to come to
terms with his childhood or to remove himself from the intolerable situation
that his childhood may have created.297  Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds have
not had the time, the freedom, or the ability to put the same distance between
themselves and the factors that drove them to violence.  While a thirty-year-old
who has been out of the house for ten years has had time to form a new life,
teenage offenders do not. 298  As a result “[t]he damage done to them emotion-
ally and mentally is not so far removed.”299  Because most sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-olds depend entirely on their parents for financial and emotional
support, they cannot escape a violent or abusive home environment.300  In many
situations, the children cannot look for outside help, either because they do not
have the courage, or because they will be severely punished for doing so.301  A
child may not even realize that his or her home environment is abnormal.  Un-
like an adult, a child “has no outside context with which to compare the abusive
reality.”302  Not only may they not know to leave, but they may not know how to
deal with staying.  Children “do not yet have the life experiences on which to
draw, and are unable psychologically to manage the abuse by putting [it] into
perspective.”303
Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds see their place in the world in a manner
very different from adults.  According to Dr. Garbarino, “adolescents are theat-
rical, viewing the world as a stage, with themselves playing the leading roles.”304
Teenagers, more often than adults, “tend to believe that they are always the star
of the show.  This is why teenagers find it nearly impossible to leave home for
school in the morning without carefully considering their appearance.  After all,
everyone will be looking at them.”305  As the star of the show, teenagers often
believe that nothing bad can happen to them, and as a result, they “have a
greater tendency than adults to take risks that endanger them.”306  They may
believe in their own invulnerability as part of the “egocentrism” associated with
the adolescent developmental process.  While they may see the possibility of
297. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (“[A sentencer must consider] any aspect of a de-
fendant’s character as a basis for a sentence less than death.”).
298. See Amnesty Report, § 5 (visited Sept. 19, 2000) <www.amnesty-usa.org/amnesty/rightsforall/
juvenile/dp/section5.html>.
299. Id.
300. See State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (recognizing battered child syn-
drome).
301. See Wasson, supra note 172, at B1.
302. Janes, 850 P.2d at 503.
303. Sacks, supra note 236, at 357.
304. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 133.
305. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
306. Grisso, supra note 82, at 14 (citing J. Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Develop-
mental Perspective, DEV. REV. 12, 339-373 (1992)).
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failure or injury or consequence as applying to others, they do not believe that it
applies to them.307
A teenager’s ability to use reason in making decisions is less developed as
well. Although their cognitive capacities may be similar to adults,  “theory sug-
gests that they will deploy those abilities with less dependability in new, am-
biguous, or stressful situations because the abilities have been acquired more
recently and are less well established.”308  They “‘are more vulnerable, more im-
pulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults,’ and are without the same ‘capacity
to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms.’”309  Furthermore,
adolescents are particularly impressionable, subject to peer pressure, and they
lack “experience, perspective, and judgment.”310  Adolescent decision-making
skills vary depending on “differences in motivation, in functioning under stress,
and in individual differences in rates of cognitive development.”311  Further-
more, “empirical studies have demonstrated that we should not expect adoles-
cents newly developed abilities to be manifested uniformly across different do-
mains of social problem solving.”312  Because behavior is a developmental
process that begins “with a nervous system bias toward survival and social re-
sponsiveness” and that is equipped to respond aggressively or fearfully when
the threat to survival is extreme,” a teenager, who has not had the experiences
that an adult has had, cannot be expected to react in the same way.313
Although some individual teenagers may be more mature than others, and
therefore better able to understand the consequences of their actions, the cur-
rent system does not effectively take into consideration the general lack of ma-
turity and experience that applies to this age group.  Although “some juveniles
may be responsible enough to be executed, [that] is not enough to validate the
execution of juveniles.”314  Our legal system does not reflect the  “very special
place in life” that  children should occupy according to Justice Frankfurter.315
As Justice Brennan noted in his Stanford dissent, immaturity should operate as
a bar to a disproportionate death sentence, but it does not.316  According to
307. See id. at 14-15 (citing David Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, CHILD DEV. 1025, 1025-34
(1967)).
308. Id. at 18 (citing Nancy G. Guerra et al., Moral Cognition and Childhood Aggression, in
AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 13-33 (L. Huesman ed., 1994); L. Mann, Stress,
Affect, and Risk Taking, in RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 201-30 (J. Yates ed., 1992); E. Scott et al., Evalu-
ating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 221-44 (1995); Stein-
berg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision
Making, 20 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 249-72 (1996)).
309. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth
Century Fund on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978)).
310. Id.
311. Grisso, supra note 82, at 18.
312. Id. at 18 (citing JOHN H. FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (1985); ROBERT S. SEIGLER,
CHILDREN’S THINKING (2d ed. 1991).
313. DEBRA NEIHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 52 (1999).
314. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted).
315. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).
316. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 397 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Brennan, “it is constitutionally inadequate that a juvenile offender’s level of re-
sponsibility be taken into account only along with a host of other facts that the
court or jury may decide outweigh that want or responsibility.”317  Because age
and immaturity are considered to be mitigating factors that can be outweighed
by other factors, a particularly heinous crime could outweigh any immaturity or
lack of understanding that a young offender may bring with him or her.  For
Brennan, this result is unacceptable because a sixteen- and seventeen-year-old
offender does not possess the requisite culpability as a matter of constitutional
law.318
B. Arbitrariness
Although creating any age limit for the imposition of the death penalty
draws a somewhat arbitrary line, the current system draws a line that is inconsis-
tent with every other legal assumption regarding juveniles under eighteen years
of age.  The age of majority in almost every state is eighteen.  Every state re-
quires that parents support children who are under eighteen, on the grounds
that children need a sanctuary in which they can grow and learn.319  Eighteen is
the age at which minors can vote, can sit on juries, can consent to medical
treatment, and can consent to marriage without an adult’s permission.320  When
the United States had a military draft, a person had to be eighteen to be
drafted.321  These restrictions reflect society’s assumption that sixteen- and sev-
enteen-year-olds:
do not yet act as adults do, and thus [the state] acts in their best interest by restricting
certain choices that [it] feels they are not yet ready to make . . . It would be ironic if
these assumptions that [the state] so readily make about children as a class—about
their inherent difference from adults in their capacity as agents, as choosers, as shapers
of their own lives—were suddenly unavailable in determining whether it is cruel and
unusual to treat children the same as adults for purposes of inflicting capital punish-
ment.322
Subjecting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to the death penalty, as if they were
rational adults making informed choices, seems hypocritical when society does
not trust them with the civic responsibilities of an adult.  As the Thompson
majority noted and the Stanford dissent reiterated,  “[t]he reasons why juveniles
are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.”323  According to the Court, eighteen is actually “a conservative estimate
of the dividing line between adolescence and adulthood [because m]any of the
317. Id.
318. See id.
319. See Richard Burr & Mandy Welch, Killing Kids Who Kill: Desecrating the Sanctuary of Child-
hood, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 929, 946 (1998).
320. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. See Burr & Welch, supra note 319, at 946.
322. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
323. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835).
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psychological and emotional changes that an adolescent experiences in matur-
ing do not actually occur until the early 20s.”324
Because society has determined that a child under eighteen is not responsi-
ble for his or her own actions, society maintains some responsibility for what
that child does until that age.325  In that respect, society is partly to blame when
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds fall into lives of crime and violence.326  The
state, in its protective role, is willing to use its parens patrie power to limit what
juveniles are permitted to do, yet it denies responsibility when those same chil-
dren run astray.  “[T]he very paternalism that our society shows toward youths
and the dependency it forces upon them mean that society bears a responsibility
for the actions of juveniles that it does not for the actions of adults who are at
least theoretically free to make their own choices.”327  As a result, “youth
crime . . . is not exclusively the offender’s fault; offenses by the young represent
a failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for
the development of America’s youth.”328  By sentencing a juvenile offender to
death, the judicial system is imposing society’s worst punishment on a person
who is still theoretically under its care and protection.
C. Failure to Consider the Rehabilitative Prospects of Juvenile Offenders
When a person is sentenced to death, society looks at his or her past actions
and determines that the future value of his or her life is worth nothing.  The fu-
ture value of a juvenile offender’s life should not be judged by the same back-
ward-looking criteria with which adult offender’s lives are judged.  Not only
does a death sentence deprive a juvenile of a greater proportion of his or her
life, but a juvenile’s future prospects for rehabilitation are greater than an
adult’s for many of the same reasons that a juvenile is less criminally culpable
than an adult.  In the absence of definitive studies concerning juvenile defen-
dants facing the death penalty, childs’ rights advocates, like Amnesty Interna-
tional, can provide insights into the individual lives of death row inmates.
A juvenile offender may be more amenable to reform for two main rea-
sons.329  First, because juvenile offenders are, by definition, still young and im-
mature at the time of their offense, their judgment and behavior can improve
over time with proper guidance—guidance that is almost never received in their
home environment.330  Justice Brennan, dissenting in Stanford, recognized that
juveniles are unlikely to engage in the kind of cost-benefit analysis that adults
do before they act.331  People learn how to weigh the costs and benefits of their
324. Id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
325. See Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 5.
326. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sen-
tencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7 (1978)).
329. See Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 5.
330. See supra section IV.
331. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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actions by trial and error as they grow and mature.  Neither the future value of
a juvenile’s life nor his or her prospects for rehabilitation should be judged by
one event that occurs when the juvenile still has a lifetime of learning and expe-
riences ahead.
Second, many juvenile offenders have never had the opportunity to get
away from their home environments.332  Prison often provides the first opportu-
nity these juveniles have to live without violence and abuse—or whatever other
problems their home lives may present.  Prison gives the juvenile a structure for
his or her life, as well as time to focus on more than mere survival.  Many juve-
niles undergo profound changes in prison.  Death Row
softens them . . . .  What is more, for the first time in their lives, if they are lucky, they
receive some attention from intelligent, caring adults—public defenders, paralegals,
investigators.  In response, these youngsters often mellow.  They let the chip drop
from their shoulders and learn to trust a little . . .  They do change, and the person
executed five or ten years after a murder is not the same person who committed the
crime.  One person committed a murder, another dies for it.333
For example, Joseph Cannon, who entered prison with an IQ of seventy-nine
(borderline mentally retarded), “thrived better on death row, where he learned
to read and write, than he ever did in his home environment.”334
A juvenile offender’s life has prospective value not only for his or her own
self-improvement but also for possible future contributions to society.  One ex-
ample is Paula Cooper, who was sentenced to death for the multiple stabbings
of a seventy-eight-year-old woman, the kind of crime “which many people say is
beyond rehabilitation or forgiveness and for which the death penalty is the only
possible response.”335  After the Indiana Supreme Court set her death sentence
aside, however, Cooper made “substantial progress towards rehabilitation,”
earning her high school certificate via correspondence with the support and en-
couragement of her victim’s grandson.336  Cooper’s remarkable transformation
occurred because prison offered an escape from the violence she experienced at
home where her father beat her with belts and electric cables and forced her
and her sisters to watch him beat and rape their mother.  Feeling the change
that occurred in prison, she decided that she wanted to help other children like
her from falling into crime.337
D. Failure to Address the Goals of Retribution and Deterrence
Although the Eighth Amendment requires that the death penalty make a
“measurable contribution” to the acceptable goals of punishment, retribution
and deterrence, these goals are not served by imposing the death penalty on ju-
332. See supra section IV.
333. See DOROTHY OTNOW LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY 313 (paperback ed. 1998).
334. Amnesty Report, §§ 4,6 (visited Sept. 19, 2000) <www.amnesty-usa.org/amnety/rightsforall/
juvenile/dp/section6.html>.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See id.
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venile offenders.338  As an expression of society’s moral outrage, the retributive
value of a punishment depends very much on the culpability of the offender.339
Because of their youth and generally limited intelligence at the time of the of-
fenses, juveniles cannot be considered fully responsible for their actions, “ren-
dering their lethal like-for-like punishment disproportionate in the extreme.”340
The Thompson court agreed that these factors, plus the “teenager’s capacity for
growth, and society’s fiduciary obligations to its children,” made retribution in-
applicable to the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender.341  Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Stanford found that drawing a line between the culpability of offend-
ers who are fifteen and offenders who are sixteen or seventeen made no sense.
Because juveniles under eighteen, as a group, “lack the culpability that makes a
crime so extreme that it may warrant . . . the death penalty,” executing juvenile
offenders “does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring
the criminal gets his just desert.”342
For juveniles, imposing the death penalty is equally ineffective as a deter-
rent. Because juvenile offenders make up only 2% of the death row popula-
tion,343 “excluding [them] from the class of persons eligible to receive the death
penalty will have little effect on any deterrent value capital punishment may
have for potential offenders who are over eighteen.”344  Deterrence is successful
only if the person to be deterred is a rational informed decision-maker who
carefully considers the gains and the losses involved.345  Given “the characteris-
tics associated with childhood—impulsiveness, lack of self control, poor judg-
ment, feelings of invincibility—the deterrent value of the juvenile death penalty
is likely of little consequence.”346  Because juveniles do not usually think in long-
range-terms, “their careful weighing of a distant, uncertain, and highly unlikely
consequence prior to action is most improbable.”347  As the Thompson court
noted, “it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punish-
ment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent,
who may be deterred by the harshest of sanctions.”348
Deterrence is also ineffective for juvenile offenders because many do not
believe, or do not care about, the possibility that they will be caught and pun-
ished.  “[J]uveniles have little fear of death because they have ‘a profound con-
338. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 403 (1989).
339. See id.
340. Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 6.
341. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836-37 (1988).
342. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 404-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
343. See Death Penalty Information Center Home Page (visited Sept. 19, 2000)
<http://www.essential. orig.dpic/juvchar.html>.
344. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
345. See id.
346. Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 5 (quoting a 1989 report by the ABA Section on Criminal
Justice).
347. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 404 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815 n.23 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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viction of their own omnipotence and immorality.’”349  Because they see them-
selves as invincible, juveniles do not believe there will be any long-term nega-
tive consequences for their actions.  Even if they do consider the consequences
from a long-term perspective, the alternatives they have are rarely any better:
They face death every day on the street and even at school, so why should they be
afraid that maybe the police will catch them and maybe they will be executed?  The
threat of sanctions can seem very insignificant when compared with the harsh realities
and immediate conditions of life on the street.350   
For those juvenile offenders who live in high crime areas, “their future pros-
pects are so bleak that potential criminal sanctions seem meaningless.”351  When
one “takes it for granted that they will not live past their twentieth birthday,”
the state cannot deter much by imposing harsh punishments.352
Imposing the death penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders
also fails to take account of other important themes which emerged from the
Court’s post-Furman decisions.353  Allowing the death penalty for juveniles does
not narrow the class of eligible offenders to the “worst” offenders.354  Because of
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders discussed above, sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders lack the criminal culpability required to place
them in the category of “worst” offenders.  Although the crimes that adoles-
cents may commit are just as harmful to the victims, adolescents “deserve less
punishment because [they] may have less capacity to control their conduct and
to think in long-range terms than adults.”355  Imposing death sentences on six-
teen- and seventeen-year-old offenders does not meet the Court’s standard of
“heightened procedural reliability.”356  Because age is only a mitigating factor,
juries are left with a significant amount of discretion in determining how much
weight to give it.  Because trial counsel may not effectively present the reasons
a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old should not be criminally culpable as a matter of
law, and because juries may chose to ignore such arguments even when they are
effectively made, the imposition of juvenile death sentences cannot be reliable.
Whether two children of the same age convicted of the same crimes in the same
county received the death penalty would turn on the counsel they were ap-
pointed and the jury that was impaneled—despite the fact that neither should
be found sufficiently culpable as a matter of law.
349. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 405 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
350. Elsea, supra note 77, at 142.
351. Ruttenberg, supra note 217, at 1908.
352. Id.
353. See infra section II.
354. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 57 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Furman
goals of death penalty statutes).
355. Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 5 (quoting a Presidential Commission reporting on youth
crime in the 1970s).
356. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 56.
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E. Breakdown in Implementing Established Rules
Because of the many differences between juvenile and adult offenders, age
should not be considered only as a mitigating factor that can be outweighed by
other aggravating factors during the sentencing phase.  A jury will often find the
future dangerousness of a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old to be a serious aggra-
vating factor, one that youth, even when coupled with other mitigating factors,
will not likely overcome.  Even though the Supreme Court requires that all
mitigating evidence be considered at the sentencing phase, factors such as the
offender’s age, history of abuse or neglect, and the presence of physical brain
damage or personality disorders do not seem to carry much weight in capital
trials.357  Looking at the backgrounds of twenty-three juvenile offenders sen-
tenced to death, Amnesty International found these extraordinary similarities:
the majority came from acutely deprived backgrounds; over half had been seriously
physically or sexually abused; 10 were known to have been regularly taking drugs or
alcohol from an early age; in many cases, the parents had histories of alcoholism, men-
tal illness or drug agues; at least 14 of the prisoners suffered from mental illness or
brain damage; and most were of below average intelligence.358
The discrepancy between what the law requires and what occurs at trial may be
explained by the tendency of jurors—and even a few judges—to make emo-
tional decisions.  One study found that in “reviewing hypothetical murder cases,
60% of a jury-roll sample in one mid-Atlantic state recommended execution for
10-year-olds.”359  Other studies of the public perception of adolescents’ culpabil-
ity “suggest that age may be only a weak mitigating factor in juries’ sentencing
decisions for serious offences.”360  These hypothetical studies are supported by
the experiences of the following three juvenile offenders.
The case of Sean Sellers361 provides an excellent example of the legal sys-
tem’s failure to consider adequately the mitigating factors or to appreciate the
psychological problems of juvenile offenders in an individualized case.  Al-
though “it seems reasonable if not essential to question the mental health of [a]
juvenile” who becomes obsessed with Satanism and then kills another per-
son,”362 this did not occur in Sellers’ case.  The trial judge did not allow the de-
fense to introduce expert testimony of the developmental differences between
adults and children because he felt “all jurors would know this anyway.”363  Nor
did the jury hear evidence of Sellers’ disturbed childhood, which showed that
after his mother left with his step-father, Sellers was left in the care of an uncle
357. See Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 5.
358. Id.
359. Grisso, supra note 82, at 6 (citing Catherine A. Crosby et al., The Juvenile Death Penalty and
the Eighth Amendment: An Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and Proportionality, LAW &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 19, 245-61 (1995)).
360. Id. at 6 (citing P. Gerstenfled & A. Tomkins, Age as a Mitigating Circumstance in Juvenile
Homicide Sentencing (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file at University of Nebraska)); P.
ROBINSON & J. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
361. See supra section III.
362. EWING, supra note 60, at 73.
363. Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 6.
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who made him wear diapers at age twelve and thirteen because he still wet the
bed.  If he wet the bed two nights in a row, he had to wear dirty diapers on his
head as punishment.364  Furthermore, Sellers’ mother and stepfather both car-
ried knives and guns, exposing him to violence at an early age.  As he grew
older, the violence continued when his uncle also tried to teach him to kill ani-
mals while hunting by stepping on their heads and pulling their legs.365
Sean Sellers also suffered from Multiple Personality Disorder (“MPD”), “a
mental condition in which ‘alter’ personalities manifest themselves in the suf-
ferer,” as well as physical brain damage that resulted from head injuries experi-
enced as a child.366  Uncontroverted expert affidavits received by the U.S. Court
of Appeals stated that Sellers suffered from MPD at the time of the killings and
that one of the alter personalities, unlikely to have understood the difference
between right and wrong, “must have been in executive control of [Sellers’] per-
son or body at those times.”367  Because a federal habeas petition was restricted
to determining whether a sentence violates the Constitution, and because the
testimony had not been subject to cross-examination at trial, the federal appel-
late court could not conclude that one juror would not have convicted him, the
standard required to overturn the decision.368  The claim of MPD could not be
invoked in the state appeals process because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals ruled that the claim was waived, as it had not been raised at trial.369  In
doing so, the court refused to treat MPD as newly-discovered evidence despite
the fact that the clinical tests for discovering and confirming its presence had
not been developed at the time of trial.370
Another example of the legal system’s failure is the case Robert Carter.
One of six children living in an impoverished Houston neighborhood, Carter
had been whipped and beaten with wooden switches, belts, and electric cords by
both his mother and step-father.371  When he was five, he was hit on the head
with a brick; when he was ten, a baseball bat smashed his head so hard that the
bat broke; and when he was seventeen, his brother shot him in the head, lodging
a bullet near his temple.372  When he was arrested for the murder of an eighteen-
year-old female, the police held this seventeen-year-old brain damaged boy in-
communicado and convinced him to confess to the murder as well as to waive
his right to a lawyer.373  At sentencing, the jury “was not invited to consider as
mitigating evidence Robert Carter’s age at the time of the crime; the fact that
he was mentally retarded (in 1986, he was found to have an IQ of seventy-four),
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. Id.
367. Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1337 (10th Cir. 1998).
368. See id. at 1339.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See Amnesty Report, supra note 298, at § 6.
372. See id.
373. See id.
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
Page 133: Summer 2000] KIDS WHO KILL 173
brain damaged, and had suffered brutal physical abuse as a child; or that this
was his first offence.”374  After ten minutes of deliberation, the jury sentenced
Carter to death.375
VI
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The United States must stop executing juvenile offenders.  It is time for leg-
islatures and courts to follow the recommendations of legal scholars, the ABA,
other national organizations, and international organizations to end this policy.
Although these organizations and individuals strongly oppose a juvenile death
penalty, their positions do not necessarily represent a general anti-death penalty
stance.  For example, in 1983, the ABA opposed the death penalty only as it
was imposed on “offenders who were under eighteen at the time of their of-
fenses.”376  The ABA continues its strong opposition to the juvenile death pen-
alty, and although the organization is currently calling for an overall morato-
rium until the death penalty can be administered fairly and impartially, it does
not believe that, once stopped, the juvenile death penalty should ever be rein-
stated.377
Ending the death penalty for juvenile offenders will require either legislative
or judicial action, as well as the support of public opinion.378  Legislators and
their constituents must be educated about the problems inherent in the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders.379  The experience of one radio talk show host, as de-
scribed by Garabino, is illustrative.  After first learning of the Jonesboro school
shootings, this individual “had thought the death penalty was justified for such
an act but [] now, as she had learned about the boys’ backgrounds (including
the report that at least one of them had been sexually abused), she was chang-
ing her mind.” 380  This talk show host “was learning about the life experiences of
boys who kill, [a] kind of learning is essential if we as a society are to choose the
path of understanding, which leads to humane treatment and rehabilitation,
rather than savage punishment to feed our hunger for revenge.”381
Public opinion can also play an important, if indirect role, in a judicial pro-
hibition on imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.  If a sufficient
number of state legislatures prohibit the execution of sixteen- and seventeen-
year-old offenders, a national consensus against the practice will be established.
374. Id.
375. See id.  Carter’s final habeas petition was denied.  See Carter v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.
1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1099 (1998).
376. American Bar Association, Report No. 107, supra note 14.
377. See id.
378. See Robert M. Bloom, American Death Penalty Opinion: Past, Present, and Future, in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 25 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
379. See id.
380. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 21.
381. Id.
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Because the lack of such a consensus was a determinative factor in Stanford,382
the establishment of one today may influence the Supreme Court to reach the
opposite result.  Additionally, a decrease in public support may influence dis-
trict attorneys—particularly elected district attorneys—when they decide
whether to seek the death penalty for a juvenile offender.  If district attorneys
seek few, or no, death sentences for juvenile offenders, this too may affect the
Court’s determination of whether a national consensus exists regarding the exe-
cution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.
Another method the judiciary could use to prohibit the practice of imposing
the death penalty on juvenile offenders would be to reinstate the proportional-
ity analysis used by the Thompson majority383 and the Stanford dissent.384  Such
an analysis compares the punishment imposed with the criminal culpability of
the offender in order to ensure that the punishment is not excessive.  Although
Scalia’s Stanford plurality opinion rejected the use of proportionality analysis, it
is not clear that a majority of the Court would do the same if presented with a
similar situation, as both O’Connor and the four dissenters believed that such
analysis was critical in making any constitutional decision regarding the death
penalty.385  If the Court were to use proportionality analysis in the future, con-
tinued research about the mental processes of juvenile offenders, specifically
involving how they make decisions and the types of factors they consider, would
be valuable in determining the retributive and deterrent effect of juvenile death
sentences.  If such studies reaffirm Justice Brennan’s conclusion that juveniles
“very generally lack the degree of blameworthiness” required for imposing the
death penalty,386 a statute that allows juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death
may fail the Court’s proportionality review.
Arguing against imposing a juvenile death sentence does not mean that ju-
veniles who kill should not face serious punishment.  Punishments should deter
future juvenile offenders, prevent repeat offenders, and contribute to society’s
desire for retribution.  In creating those punishments, however, judges and ju-
ries must recognize the important fundamental differences between adults and
juveniles that have been discussed earlier in this note.  While incarcerated, ju-
venile offenders must have the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.  One
commentator proposes “an incarceration alternative of about twenty-five years
followed by the possibility of parole,” which would “permit us to protect our-
selves in the short term from presently violent teenagers,” while allowing them
a chance for rehabilitation.387  Setting a specific “magic number” for the length
382. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
383. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
384. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 391-94 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
385. Both O’Connor and the dissenters in Stanford would have used the proportionality analysis.
According to O’Connor, “this Court does have a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality
analysis.” Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
386. Id. at 402-03 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
387. Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 74.
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of time a juvenile offender should be incarcerated is less important than recog-
nizing that juvenile offenders need the chance to reverse the violent patterns
that may have been established in their lives and that this chance cannot occur
if life is taken from them.
When children become killers, it is much easier to impose the death penalty
than to address the underlying societal problems that contribute to their vio-
lence in the first place.  However, a policy focusing solely on punishment will
never effectively remove violent youths from society.  Although society’s im-
mediate attention is often focused on how to deal with juvenile offenders once
they have committed violent acts, it is equally, if not more, important to address
the societal problems that cause them to be violent in the first place.
[Society’s] primary attention should be not on sixteen-year-old Johnny who rapes and
kills people, but on Johnny’s younger brothers who will grow up to be just like him.
We not only have to take Johnny out of circulation for as long as necessary, but we
have to work with our communities to change the lives of all of these children.388
Because the problems of juvenile violence are so complex, solutions are not
easy.  It is also clear, however, that an effective solution requires recognizing
some basic facts. First, in cases of juvenile violence, early intervention is essen-
tial because when children are young, they develop the emotional connections
to family and community that determine the patterns, either healthy or un-
healthy, which govern their way of functioning in society.389  Second, to be effec-
tive, intervention will require the participation of a broad range of social institu-
tions:390
388. Id.
389. See GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 52.  Without strong emotional connections, children will have
a hard time learning to empathize with, sympathize with, or care for, other human beings.
Early intervention must begin at home due to the profound effect a parent has on his or her child.
Helping parents learn to be parents is not only an important step towards reducing abuse and/or ne-
glect, it is also an important step towards reducing the number of children who kill.  See Heide, supra
note 293, at 46.  “[P]arenting must again become a priority for Americans.”  Id. at 46.  Educational op-
portunities, community support groups, and social welfare programs can all encourage good parenting.
Parents must come to understand the very important role they have in the life of their child, and the
community must provide impoverished parents with the financial and emotional support they need to
ensure that their children are supervised and well cared for.  See id. at 48.  Parenting classes should be
made available to help parents with the difficulties of raising children and should increase parental
awareness about home and child management, as well as the importance of developing open lines of
communication and strong parent-child ties.  See id. at 47.
Hawaii Healthy Start is an example of a successful government program that teaches effective par-
enting.  In this program, home visitors work with mothers shortly after the child’s birth, teaching par-
enting skills, facilitating the government programs, and establishing a relationship with a primary care
physician for the baby.  See Judy Briscoe, Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Rational Approach to At-
Risk Youth, 61 FED. PROBATION 3, 6 (1997).
390. Adults need to stimulate the development of empathy to help juveniles “connect to the abstract
principles of morality with real-life situations and feelings.” GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 142.  Adults
who work with children, especially at-risk children, need to be prepared to intervene if they see any of
the following signs which often indicate that a child is prone to violence: social withdrawal, often stem-
ming from feelings of unworthiness and rejection; excessive feelings of isolation and being alone; exces-
sive feelings of rejection; feelings of being picked on and persecuted, which can include ridicule or
teasing; low school interest and poor academic performance; expressions of violence in drawings and
writings; patterns of impulsive and chronic hitting, intimidation and bullying behaviors, intolerance for
differences and prejudicial attitudes; possession of firearms or other lethal objects; and affiliation with
HOROWITZ_FMT.DOC 12/07/00  12:28 PM
176 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 3
community organizations,391 schools,392 churches, social welfare agencies, and the
juvenile justice system.
Third, tougher weapons laws are needed to keep handguns and other weap-
ons out of juveniles’ hands, which will help to improve the safety of many
neighborhoods and schools.  Fourth and finally, the juvenile justice system
needs to emphasize rehabilitation by providing counseling and guidance to ju-
venile offenders.393  Every one of these basic facts needs to be addressed if a so-
lution to juvenile violence is to be effective.
VII
CONCLUSION
Some boys get lost because they are systematically led into a moral wilderness by their
experiences at home and on the streets, where they are left to fend for themselves.
These are the boys upon whose behalf I testify in court, trying to help judge and jury
see the injustice of their experiences and how they have been robbed of their child-
hood by abusive and neglectful parents, by malevolent drug dealers, and by the sheer
viciousness of their daily life.  And I argue that to simply punish them with death . . .
only compounds the injustice imposed upon them by the world in which the grew up.394
gangs.  See Tia Schneider Denebert et al., Reducing Violence in U.S. Schools, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 30
(Nov. 1998).
Community classes can teach older children about the effects of abuse at home and the effects of
parental alcoholism and chemical dependency.  This education is critical if juveniles are to understand
that such parental behavior is not considered normal—or healthy—by society.  If children can learn to
recognize physical abuse or substance abuse at its early stages, they can be encouraged to “take appro-
priate action if victimized or threatened.”  Heide, supra note 293, at 47.
391. Preschool programs such as Head Start can provide the support that children need during their
most formative years.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 395, 412 (1997).  By working with
children at very young ages, these programs provide a stable base from which a child can grow.  They
are often successful at increasing literacy and self-esteem as well as in teaching children societal values
like compassion and generosity, which they may not be exposed to at home.  See id.
Neighborhood recreational centers provide children with a safe place to go after school, keeping
them off the streets, and away from violence. See Heide, supra note 293, at 47.  Community centers can
provide academic tutors and encourage extracurricular activities like acting or painting.  Community
sports leagues not only provide a safe way for children to spend time after school, but also teach chil-
dren the value of teamwork and good sportsmanship.  See Schulhofer, supra, at 415.
Neighborhood businesses can be encouraged to provide local teenagers employment opportunities,
which will provide them with an opportunity to take on responsibility, successfully hold a job, and earn
money for themselves and their families.  See Heide, supra note 293, at 47.
392. Providing school systems with increased funding and additional resources, including teachers,
will equalize educational opportunities and will increase the number of individual academic success sto-
ries.  Successful education can improve communication skills and encourage peaceful methods of dis-
pute resolution.  See id. at 47.  Improving the school systems can give more students the opportunity to
succeed at school.  In turn, this educational success will increase the students’ self-esteem.  See id.  Im-
proving the school system can also give students more hope for the future.  Rather than feeling trapped
in the inner city, the prospect of college and/or a future job may provide a goal to work and fight for.
393. See Eric R. Lotke, Youth Homicide: Keeping Perspective on How Many Children Kill, 31 VAL.
U. L. REV. 395, 416 (1997).  For example, beginning or non-violent offenses should be punished imme-
diately with community service or diversion. See id.  More serious offenses should be punished with in-
termediate sanctions, “such as intensive supervision or wilderness camps, and truly serious or violent
offenders should be placed in secure corrections facilities.”  Id.  All juveniles who enter the juvenile jus-
tice system should be placed in “structured after-care” programs to help them understand why they did
what they did and why it was wrong.  Id.
394. GARBARINO, supra note 2, at 23.
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Imposing the death penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders is
wrong and will not solve the root causes of juvenile violence.  Not only does it
contradict every legal assumption made about juveniles under the age of eight-
een, but it fails to address or even consider the many reasons that push juveniles
to violence.  Executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders ignores the
differences in culpability, maturity, and rationality that distinguish juvenile of-
fenders from adults and that should prevent juveniles from being placed in soci-
ety’s class of “worst offenders,” a prerequisite for being death-eligible.395  Be-
cause those same differences make juveniles more amenable to rehabilitation, a
juvenile offender’s life could have some future value to society if he or she were
given the opportunity to develop and mature while under state supervision.
Life should not be taken when the potential for improvement still exists.
Although the Supreme Court has held that executing sixteen- and seven-
teen-year-old offenders does not violate the Constitution, the Court has not
clearly and strongly endorsed the death penalty for juvenile offenders.396  The
two critical juvenile death penalty cases were decided by narrow margins with-
out majority opinions,397 and for this reason, a future challenge to imposing the
death penalty on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders may result in a new
constitutional standard.  This reversal will probably not occur, however, until
society understands more clearly why children kill and what factors contribute
to juvenile violence.  As people learn more about what drives children to kill, as
they understand that these children are often victims of the same violence they
imitate, perhaps a more compassionate consensus about how to punish youthful
offenders will begin to emerge.  At that point, society’s attention can focus on
correcting the underlying problems that create violent children in the first place.
Only then will the United States be prepared to deal effectively with children
who kill.
395. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 57.
396. See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 73.
397. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1998), resulted in a four justice plurality, a concurring
opinion, and a three justice dissent.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 491 U.S. 361 (1989), resulted in a four justice
plurality, a concurring opinion and a four justice dissent.
Some scholars speculate that had Justice Powell retired one year later, waiting until after Thompson
was decided, the Court would have forbidden the execution of offenders who were under 18 at the time
of their crime.  See Streib, Moratorium on the Death Penalty, supra note 51, at 60.
